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Abstract
Historically, the gift tax has performed the admirable role of safeguarding the
integrities of both the estate and income taxes. Due to taxpayers’ abilities to nar-
row the gift tax base and ignore their filing obligations, however, fulfillment of
its historical role is now in jeopardy. This analysis details how taxpayers circum-
vent their gift tax obligations and then sets forth reforms that Congress can readily
institute to curb taxpayers’ transgressions. Institution of these recommendations
would enable the gift tax to continue to fulfill its historic functions.
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Historically, the gift tax has performed the admirable role of 
safeguarding the integrities of both the estate and income taxes.  Due to 
taxpayers’ abilities to narrow the gift tax base and ignore their filing 
obligations, however, fulfillment of its historical role is now in jeopardy.  
This analysis details how taxpayers circumvent their gift tax obligations and 
then sets forth reforms that Congress can readily institute to curb taxpayers’ 
transgressions.  Institution of these recommendations would enable the gift 
tax to continue to fulfill its historic functions. 
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2I.  INTRODUCTION 
The United States gift tax is truly a unique tax insofar as it generates 
virtually no revenue.  For 2005, the last year for which there is available 
data, the gift tax raised approximately $2 billion1—well less than .1 percent 
of the overall revenue collected by the federal government for the same 
year and in stark contrast to the $1.1 trillion that the income tax alone 
raised for the same tax year.2 This 2005 collection figure, moreover, is not 
an aberration.  Historically, the gift tax has raised very little revenue, and 
projections indicate that this trend is likely to continue.3
On the one hand, since taxpayers each have a $1 million lifetime 
gift exemption amount that allows them to transfer amounts up to this 
threshold without being subject to the payment of any gift tax,4 this lack of 
revenue generation is not wholly unexpected.  On the other hand, because 
of flaws in the gift tax, substantial amounts of wealth are transferred 
without the payment of any transfer tax; the two most important flaws are 
the significant shortcomings in the way assets are valued and the absence of 
well-conceived reporting and penalty systems.    
This paper argues that if the gift tax is to be fully functional and to 
fulfill its historic missions—namely, to safeguard the integrity of the estate 
and income taxes5—Congress must institute reforms.  The first would be to 
put into place more accurate methodologies for valuing gifts of closely held 
business interests and certain trust contributions.  The second would be to 
introduce a series of reporting requirements and a penalty structure that 
would enable the IRS to detect and punish those taxpayers who transgress 
their gift tax filing responsibilities.  
To demonstrate that the gift tax and the reporting practices 
associated with it are in dire need of reform, we have pedagogically 
 
1 STATISTICS OF INCOME DIV., UNPUBLISHED DATA, IRS, INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERVICE DATA BOOK 2005, PUBLICATION 55B (Mar. 2006), available at 
http://irs.gov/pub/irs-sol/04gf01gt.vls. 
2 Id.
3 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE RESEARCH ANALYSIS AND STATISTICS 
OFFICE OF RESEARCH DOCUMENT 6292: FISCAL RETURN PROJECTIONS FOR THE UNITED 
STATES 2006–2013, at tbl.1 (rev. 6-2006) (showing that the number of gift tax returns 
anticipated to be filed remains static over the next few years). 
4 I.R.C. § 2505.  Prior to the introduction of the lifetime gift exemption in 2001 
(Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 
521(b), 115 Stat. 38), Congress had instituted what was known as the unified credit.  This 
credit allowed taxpayers during their lifetimes and upon their deaths to transfer, in the 
aggregate, up to $600,000 free from transfer tax.   Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, 
Pub. L. No. 97-34, §§ 401–02, 95 Stat. 172.   
5 See generally infra notes 8–23 and accompanying text. 
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3organized this paper in the following fashion:  By way of background, part 
II sets forth the historic role of the gift tax.  Part III highlights the salient 
features of the gift tax, including its reporting requirements and the 
penalties that apply to those taxpayers who are noncompliant; in addition, 
part III also details taxpayer valuation stratagems that are designed to 
narrow the gift tax base.  Part IV makes recommendations on how 
Congress can restore soundness to the gift tax and bolster overall taxpayer 
compliance.  Finally, in part V, we present our conclusions.    
 
II. HISTORIC ROLE OF THE GIFT TAX  
Unlike other taxes, the gift tax does not serve an independent 
function.6 Rather, Congress designed it to protect the integrity of the estate 
tax and income tax.7 Strong historical support for this proposition is found 
in the congressional record.    
Consider that in 1916 Congress introduced an estate tax.8 While 
arguments continue about the justification of the estate tax,9 no one has 
 
6 Most taxes are designed to achieve particular goals, such as to raise revenue 
(e.g., the income tax), see Terrance Chorvat & Elizabeth Chorvat, Income Tax as Implicit 
Insurance Against Losses from Terrorism, 36 IND. L. REV. 425, 427 (2003) (“The income tax is 
designed to raise revenue.”); regulate institutional behavior (e.g., the corporate tax); see, 
e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society, and the State: A Defense of the Corporate Tax, 90 
VA. L. REV. 1193, 1244 (2004) (“[T]he corporate tax is justified as a means to control the 
excessive accumulation of power in the hands of corporate management. . . .”)., or curb 
undesirable conduct (e.g., so-called sin taxes),  see Samantha K. Graff, State Taxation of 
Online Tobacco Sales:  Circumventing the Archaic Bright Line Penned by Quill, 58 FLA. L. REV. 375, 
379 (“[Sin taxes] deter buyers from indulging in harmful products by making those 
products more expensive to obtain.”). 
7 Admittedly, another tax that shares this protective feature is the generation-
skipping transfer (GST) tax.  I.R.C. § 2601 et seq.  This tax applies in instances where 
transfers are made to so-called “skip persons” (in most instances, the donor’s or decedent’s 
grandchildren).  I.R.C. § 2613.  The purpose of this tax is to protect the integrities of both 
the gift and estate taxes from wealthy taxpayers who could otherwise achieve long-term 
deferral of these taxes.  The Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2006, 90 Stat. 
1520, 1879–90, contained a GST tax that Congress later repealed retroactively when it 
enacted another form of GST tax in 1986.  Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-51, 
§§1431-33, 100 Stat. 2085, 2717–32.  Several commentators question whether the 
introduction of the GST tax has proven counterproductive.  See, e.g., Mary Louise 
Fellows, Why the Generation Skipping Transfer Tax Sparked Perpetual Trusts, 27:6 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 2511 (2006). 
8 See Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, §§ 200–12, 39 Stat. 756, 777–80 ("A tax . . . is 
hereby imposed upon the transfer of the net estate of every decedent dying after the 
passage of this Act.").   
9 There are several historical justifications for the emergence of the estate tax.  
James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825 (2001). Among the 
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4argued that the estate tax can be effectively enforced without a gift tax:  in 
the absence of a gift tax, the estate tax could be too easily defeated by 
lifetime gifts.10 To eliminate such strategies, in the Revenue Act of 1924, 
Congress instituted the gift tax as a companion to the estate tax.11 After an 
initial rocky start (the gift tax was repealed two years after its introduction 
and then reinstated),12 the gift tax has since been a “junior partner” to the 
estate tax.13 
There was a second agenda associated with the passage of the gift 
tax, namely, to preserve the integrity of the progressive tax rate structure of 
the income tax.14 In 1916, Congress instituted a surtax to the income tax.15 
many stated purposes was the need to raise revenue and to impede the buildup of large 
wealth concentrations.   
For evidence that one role of the estate tax was to raise revenue, see H.R. REP.
NO. 64-922, at 1 (1916), reprinted in Act of September 8, 1916, 1939-1, pt. 2, C.B. 22, 22 
("The necessity for [the estate tax] grows out of the extraordinary increase in the 
appropriations for the Army and Navy and the fortification of our country."). See generally 
RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 104–09 (1954) (noting that 
World War I gave Congress a significant incentive to implement an estate tax); Louis 
Eisenstein, The Rise and Decline of the Estate Tax, 11 TAX L. REV. 223 (1956) (tracing the 
historic progression of estate tax implementation and its purposes).   
For evidence that another role of the estate tax was to curtail wealth 
accumulations, see S. REP. NO. 73-558, at 7 (1934), reprinted in Revenue Bill of 1934, 1939-
1 C.B. 586, 591 (suggesting that increasing estate tax rates "will tend to prevent undue 
accumulation of wealth" and that this "objective is more properly reached by estate-tax 
than by income-tax increases"). See generally K. Jay Holdsworth et al., Report on Transfer 
Tax Restructuring, 41 TAX LAW. 395, 396 (1988) ("The transfer taxes serve, among other 
purposes, to limit the perpetuation of large private concentrations of wealth. . . .").  
10 C. Lowell Harriss, Legislative History of Federal Gift Taxation, 18 TAXES 531, 533 
(1940) ("[G]ifts . . . were costing much revenue, more . . . than tax exemptions. . . ."). 
11 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §§ 319–24, 43 Stat. 253, 313–16. See Estate of 
Sanford v. Comm’r, 308 U.S. 39, 44 (1939) ("An important, if not the main, purpose of the 
gift tax was to prevent or compensate for avoidance of death taxes."). 
12 The gift tax was repealed in 1926, Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1200, 44 Stat. 
9, 125, but later reenacted in 1932. Gift Tax Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 532, 47 Stat. 169, 245–
59. 
13 RICHARD B. STEPHENS ET AL., FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION ¶ 1.03 
[1] (7th ed. 1997); see also ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY & ROSWELL MAGILL, FEDERAL 
TAXES ON ESTATES, TRUSTS AND GIFTS 1935–36, at 275 (1935) (noting that the gift tax 
was "originally passed to prevent the evasion of estate taxes").  
14After the Republican chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, 
Representative William R. Green of Iowa, made the point that the gift tax was needed as a 
necessary backstop to the estate tax, he added that the gift tax was also "needed on 
account of the income tax." 65 CONG. REC. 3120 (1924). Green explained that gifts of 
property could be used to avoid or reduce the tax on income from that property. Id.; see 
also 2 RANDOLPH PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 359 (1942) (pointing out 
the perceived congressional need to institute a gift tax lest taxpayers "distribute income 
among a greater number of taxpayers . . . to reduce the surtax brackets"). 
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5This surtax, combined with the existing bracket structure of the income tax, 
made taxpayers’ incomes subject to highly progressive tax rates.16 In this 
highly progressive rate environment, the gift tax proved necessary to avoid 
the practice of income shifting, whereby taxpayers could gift income-
producing assets to related taxpayers whose income was taxed in lower 
income tax brackets.17 Institution of the gift tax thus was intended to make 
the practice of income shifting no longer economically viable from a tax-
savings perspective.      
In 1976 Congress unified the estate and gift taxes.18 Under 
unification, all lifetime gifts made after 1976 are, in effect, included in the 
calculation of the estate tax. 19 To illustrate, suppose a taxpayer makes a $1 
million gift today, files a gift tax return reporting this gift, and then dies 
several years later with a gross estate of $2 million.  With respect to this 
illustration, the taxpayer’s estate tax will be computed utilizing a tax base of 
$3 million (the sum of the taxpayer’s gross estate of $2 million plus the 
taxpayer’s $1 million prior taxable gift).  The 1976 legislation essentially 
equated lifetime transfers to accelerated testamentary bequests and treated 
them, in most respects, as one and the same.20 
15 Compare Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 1(b), 39 Stat. 756, 757 (imposing a 
top surtax rate of 13 percent), and War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 2, 40 Stat. 300, 301 
(imposing a top surtax rate of 50 percent). 
16 See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Kwall, The Uncertain Case Against the Double Taxation of 
Corporate Income, 68 N.C. L. REV. 613 n.32 (2000) (highlighting the normal and the surtax 
rates). 
17 The Supreme Court has created an income tax doctrine that eliminates the 
opportunity for taxpayers to shift certain income to low-bracket relatives. See  Lucas v. 
Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930), and its progeny.  But the doctrine does not apply where an 
income-producing asset is gifted to a low-bracket taxpayer.  In such a case, the recipient 
taxpayer is taxable on the postgift income.  Taft v. Bowers, 278 US 470 (1929).  High-
bracket taxpayers may also shift income to low-bracket taxpayers by gifting appreciated 
assets before they are sold, thereby causing the gain at the time of the sale to be taxed at 
the donee’s bracket.  For an excellent exposition of the assignment of income doctrine, see 
Charles S. Lyon & James S. Eustice, Assignment of Income: Fruit and Tree as Irrigated by the P. 
G. Lake Case, 17 TAX L. REV. 293 (1961–62). 
18 See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, §§ 200–10, 90 Stat. 1520, 
1846–48 (unifying estate and gift taxes and adding a tax on generation-skipping transfers); 
see also Stanley S. Surrey, Reflections on the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 25 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 303, 
319–28 (1976) (detailing the history and nature of the legislative changes that overhauled 
the transfer tax system). 
19 See I.R.C. § 2001(b). 
20 The one major difference between the gift and estate taxes is that the gift tax is 
computed on a tax-exclusive basis whereas the estate tax is computed on a tax-inclusive 
basis. 
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6In 2001, Congress passed legislation that would, at least on a 
temporary basis, eliminate the estate tax.21 This same legislation, however, 
retained the gift tax.22 Legislative history reveals the reason for this 
retention:  Congress had the same concern that it harbored decades 
earlier—absent a gift tax, taxpayers might easily defeat the progressive rate 
structure of the income tax by engaging, once again, in the practice of 
income shifting.23 Retention of the gift tax was thus seen as a necessary 
defense against the potential onslaught of aggressive taxpayers who, in 
order to mitigate or defeat their income tax burdens, would turn to the 
practice of income shifting.    
These historic underpinnings have played a pivotal role in shaping 
the salient features of the gift tax.  The question now is whether the gift tax, 
in terms of its application and its administration, can fulfill its historic 
missions of safeguarding the integrities of the estate and income taxes.  In 
resolving this question, part III of this analysis casts doubt. 
 
III. ANALYSIS OF THE GIFT TAX 
Congress generally imposes a gift tax on all gratuitous transfers of 
property, tangible or intangible, wherever located.24 This definition 
theoretically furnishes the gift tax with a broad base upon which to impose 
a tax.  Section A outlines the reasons why the gift tax base is not nearly as 
broad as one might anticipate, section B discusses the flaws in the reporting 
 
21 Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 501, 115 Stat. 38, 69 (2001).    
22 Id. § 511(d).  
23 See, e.g., Jonathan G. Blattmachr & Mitchell M. Gans, Wealth Transfer Tax 
Repeal: Some Thoughts on Policy and Planning, 90 TAX NOTES 393, 395 (2001) ("[T]hose who 
seek repeal . . . have not considered the ways in which taxpayers will be able to 'game' the 
income tax system, and thereby undermine its progressive character, if repeal of the gift tax 
is achieved."); John Buckley, Transfer Tax Repeal Proposals: Implications for the Income Tax, 90 
TAX NOTES 539 (2001) (suggesting that "the gift tax eliminates transfers of property to 
aged relatives, a transaction which will become very attractive upon repeal of the gift tax."); 
Lauren Y. Detzel, Attorney's Testimony at W&M Hearing on Bush Tax Relief, 2001 TNT 56-83 
(Mar. 22, 2001) ("If the gift tax is repealed, . . . taxpayers [will] give income producing 
assets to others in lower income tax brackets at no gift tax cost."). But see Ronald D. 
Aucutt, Gift Tax Repeal Bill Minimizes Income Tax Problems, 91 TAX NOTES 1015, 1016 (2001) 
(arguing against the need for retaining the gift tax in light of the fact that current laws 
removed many of the opportunities for income tax abuse); Charles D. Fox IV & Svetlana 
V. Bekman, Gift Tax Repeal: Responding to Opponents' Concerns, 92 TAX NOTES 1733, 1736 
(2001) ("Gift tax supporters underestimate the ability of . . . laws to anticipate and prevent 
abuses.").  
24 I.R.C. § 2511.  The gift tax is imposed on the value of what the donor transfers, 
not what the donee receives.  Shepherd v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 376, 385 (2000) (citing, inter 
alia, Roinette v. Helvering, 318 U.S. 184, 186 (1943)), aff’d, 283 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2002).    
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7and penalty systems associated with gift giving, and section C offers a 
detailed illustration that portrays the systemic shortcomings of the gift tax.   
 
A. The Gift Tax Base 
Notwithstanding the fact that the gift tax appears to apply to any 
gratuitous transfer of property,25 for reasons relating to public policy (e.g., 
promotion of education and health) and for administrative convenience, 
several kinds of gifts are not included in the gift tax base.  Such nontaxable 
gifts include tuition payments,26 medical remittances,27 and so-called annual 
exclusion gifts (i.e., those gifts such as wedding and birthday presents that 
do not annually exceed $12,000 and which Congress deems too small in 
nature to take into account).28 After tallying all the forms of gratuitous 
transfers that are excluded or exempt from gift tax, what remains?  At least 
initially there would appear to be a fairly broad base of gratuitously 
transferred assets upon which the gift tax could be imposed.      
But the gift tax base is far narrower than one might anticipate.  In 
valuing assets, the Internal Revenue Code (Code) presently requires 
application of the so-called “willing buyer / willing seller” test.29 This 
ostensibly evenhanded test declares that an asset’s fair market value is equal 
to “the price at which such property would change hands between a willing 
buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or 
sell, and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts.”30 Subsection 
(1) explores why, in the context of certain gratuitous transfers, application 
of the willing buyer / willing seller test artificially depresses asset values, 
unintentionally narrowing the gift tax base.  Furthermore, subsection (2) 
inspects how another flawed valuation process applicable to trust 
contributions results in a similar narrowing of the gift tax base.    
 
25 I.R.C. § 2511. . 
26 I.R.C. § 2503(e)  
27 Id.
28 I.R.C. § 2503(b). 
29 See United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 551 (1973) (“The willing buyer-
willing seller test of fair market value is nearly as old as the federal income, estate, and gift 
taxes themselves.…”). 
30 Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1; see also Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1951-1 C.B. 237 (setting forth 
numerous criteria considered in determining fair market value). 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
81. Application of the Willing Buyer / Willing Seller 
Test  
By way of background, for gift tax purposes, the fair market value 
of an asset governs the amount of gift tax a transfer generates.31 To 
determine an asset’s fair market value, the Treasury regulations require 
application of the willing buyer / willing seller test.32 For many items, such 
as bonds and marketable securities, application of the willing buyer / seller 
test results in the “correct” fair market value determination (i.e., were the 
donee to immediately turn around and sell the property in question, the sale 
proceeds would equal the result determined under the willing buyer / 
willing seller test).    
But when it comes to valuing closely held business interests 
(whether in partnership or corporate form), application of the willing buyer 
/ willing seller test proves deficient:33 taxpayers are able to transfer items at 
artificially depressed values.34 More specifically, as applied in this context, 
the test permits taxpayers to capitalize upon so-called lack-of-control and 
marketability discounts.  The lack-of-control discount is operative if the 
gifted interest represents a minority stake in the business venture (offering 
 
31 I.R.C. § 2512(a). 
32 See supra note 33. 
33 When it comes to the transfer of fractional interests in real property, 
application of the willing buyer / willing seller test also proves deficient, creating an 
environment where artificially depressed asset values are also prevalent.  Courts routinely 
grant valuation discounts to fractional property interests; these discounts have a broad 
range.  See Williams v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-59, (44 percent discount); 
Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1982) (20 percent discount); Estate of 
Stewart v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 201 (1934) (15 percent discount).  The rationale courts 
offer for discounts of this nature is that a divided property interest is worth less than an 
undivided property interest.  This is because taxpayers lack complete control of the 
management of the property and decisions about it, the possibility that a controversy could 
arise between the co-owners and the necessity of getting them to agree on a sale, and the 
recognition that the property might ultimately have to be partitioned. Shepherd v. 
Commissioner, 115 T.C. 376 (2000), aff’d, 283 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2002).  Some courts, 
however, limit the size of the discount to the amount of anticipated expense associated 
with instituting a partition action to separate the real property interests.  Estate of Fittl v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1986-542 (held that the discount attributable to an undivided 
interest in real property should be limited to the cost of partition); see also Kennedy v. 
Comm’r, 804 F.2d 1332 (7th Cir. 1986) (same).   
34 See generally Ronald H. Jensen, The Magic of Disappearing Wealth Revisited Using 
Family Limited Partnerships to Reduce Estate and Gift Tax, 1 PITTSBURGH. TAX REV. 155, 183–
85 (2004); see generally D. John Thornton & Gregory A. Byron, Valuation of Family Limited 
Partnership Interests, 32 IDAHO L. REV. 345 (1996); Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. 
McCouch, Family Limited Partnerships, Discounts, Options, and Disappearing Value, 6 FLA. TAX 
L. REV. 649 (2004). 
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9no governing voice);35 the marketability discount is operative if the 
transferred interest is not freely tradable on a public exchange (such as the 
New York Stock Exchange or the NASDAQ).36 Common combined 
minority and marketability valuation discounts often range from 15 percent 
to as high as 70 percent.37 
To illustrate how valuation discounts systematically depress the 
value of closely held business interests, consider the following example.  
Suppose Company X is worth $1 million and F owns all ten of its 
outstanding shares.  Suppose further that F transfers one of his Company X 
shares to his daughter, D.  For gift tax purposes, rather than valuing this 
one share of stock representing a 10 percent interest for $100,000, the one 
share of Company X stock would be valued at, say, $60,000 to reflect the 
facts that a hypothetical purchaser of the gifted interest would not have 
control of the entity and such share would not be as readily marketable as 
publicly traded shares.  Barring extenuating circumstances (i.e., explicit or 
implicit retention of control over such transferred interests),38 the courts 
 
35 See, e.g., Alan L. Feld, The Implications of Minority Interest and Stock Restrictions in 
Valuing Closely-Held Shares, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 934, 935–36 (1974) (“A minority interest in a 
corporation controlled by others may be worth significantly less than the liquidation value 
of the shares.”). 
36 See generally SHANNON P. PRATT ET AL., VALUING A BUSINESS: THE 
ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL OF CLOSELY HELD COMPANIES 391–423 (4th ed. 2000).  
37 For an exhaustive and excellent summary of the discounts courts have 
permitted taxpayers, see generally Louis Mezzullo, Valuation of Corporate Stock, 831-2nd 
TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIO, at worksheet 1 (2007) (in a detail chart, the author delineates for 
each case the minority discount, marketability discount, unspecified or combined discount, 
and the control premium, if any).   
38 Andrea B. Short, Adequate and Full Uncertainty:  Courts’ Application of Section 
2036(a) of the Internal Revenue Code to Family Limited Partnerships, 84 N.C. L. REV. 694 (2006); 
Daniel H. Ruttenberg, The Tax Court’s Execution of the Family Entity:  The Tax Court’s 
Application of Internal Revenue Code Section 2036(a) to Family Entities, 80 N.D. L. REV. 41 
(2004); Courtney Lieb, Comment, The IRS Wages War on the Family Limited Partnership:  How 
to Establish a Family Limited Partnership That Will Withstand Attack, 71 UMKC L. REV. 887 
(2003); see, e.g., Strangi v. Comm’r, 417 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 2005) (taxpayer’s retained 
interest was implied when partnership distributions were used to meet taxpayer’s daily 
living expenses); Estate of Thompson v. Comm’r, 382 F.3d 367 (3d Cir. 2004) (when 
ninety-five-year-old taxpayer transferred nearly all of his assets into a family limited 
partnership, court held that taxpayer had retained an implied interest as to all the 
transferred assets).  But see, e.g., Kimbell v. United States, 371 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2004) (on 
somewhat similar facts, the IRS was not able to convince the Fifth Circuit that a ninety-six-
year-old taxpayer who had transferred the vast majority of her assets into a family limited 
partnership held a retained interest as to all the partnership assets).  
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have sanctioned the use of such discounts in the family setting,39 and the 
IRS has reluctantly accepted the outcome of these decisions.40
The willing buyer / willing seller test, however, as presently applied, 
lacks dimension.  Its entire focus is on the price that an unrelated, 
hypothetical purchaser would pay for the gifted interest.  While this 
approach works effectively in most situations, it fails to take into account 
the reality that, in the case of a harmonious family, the concerns that 
ordinarily animate minority discounts are not present.41 Put differently, 
while an unrelated purchaser would reduce the amount of the purchase 
price to reflect, for example, a concern about self-dealing by the controlling 
shareholder, these same concerns are usually absent in the related-party 
context.  To the contrary, it is anticipated that related family members will 
work together; otherwise, the intrarelated party exchange would not have 
happened at the outset.42 
Application of the willing buyer / willing seller test also produces 
two different kinds of incongruous outcomes.   
The first is between gifts of different sizes.  Consider, for example, 
a father who owns 100 percent of stock in a company.  If he were to gift all 
of his company stock to his daughter, no minority discount would be 
available.43 If, however, he gifted the same stock to her in three equal 
installments, a minority discount would suddenly become available for each 
installment of the three-prong gift.44 On its face, such disparate outcomes 
 
39 See supra note 37.  
40 See Rev. Rul. 93-12, 1993-1 C.B. 202 (for the first time, the IRS conceded that 
“a minority discount will not be disallowed solely because a transferred interest, when 
aggregated with interests held by family members, would be a part of a controlling 
interest”). 
41 See, e.g., Estate of Newhouse v. Comm’r, 94 T.C. 193, 251-52 (1990) 
(“[C]ontrol means that, because of the interest owned, the shareholder can unilaterally 
direct corporate action, select management, decide the amount of distribution, rearrange 
the corporation's capital structure, and decide whether to liquidate, merge, or sell assets.”). 
 
42 It is conceivable that if an entity is controlled by a family and there is tension 
between or among family members, a minority discount would be appropriate if such 
discord could be established by clear and convincing evidence.  Rev. Rul. 81-253, 1981-2 
C.B. 187 (“However, when there is evidence of family discord or other factors indicating 
that the family would not act as a unit in controlling the corporation, a minority discount 
may be allowed.”), revoked by Rev. Rul. 93-12, supra note 40. 
43 Indeed, anytime a controlling block of shares (i.e., greater than 50 percent) is 
transferred, application of a control premium may be appropriate.  Rev. Rul. 59-60, § 4.02, 
C.B. 1959-1 C.B. 237. 
44 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
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for two transactions that are essentially the same in nature raise serious 
equity concerns. 
A second incongruous outcome produced by the willing buyer / 
willing seller test is between applications of the gift and estate taxes.  
Consider the fact pattern set forth in Revenue Ruling 93-12.45 In the ruling, 
a taxpayer owned 100 percent of a company’s stock, which he 
simultaneously transferred in equal shares to each of his five children.  The 
IRS ruled that for gift tax purposes, the taxpayer could discount the value 
of each 20 percent interest owing to its lack-of-control/minority status.  
Suppose, instead, that immediately before the taxpayer completed the gift, 
he died and bequeathed a 20 percent interest in the company to each of his 
five children.  In such a case, due to his 100 percent controlling interest 
(immediately prior to death), for estate tax purposes, no valuation discounts 
would be available.46 This inequity in the valuation process is particularly 
problematic given that one of the major purposes of the gift tax is to 
prevent lifetime transfers from escaping the estate tax.47 
In light of taxpayers’ remarkable success in capitalizing upon 
valuation discounts,48 it is not surprising that practitioners tout their use.  
 
45 See Rev. Rul. 93-12, supra note 40. 
46 See, e.g., Ahmanson Found. v. U.S. 674 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that 
property must be valued in the hands of the estate with no weight accorded to whom the 
beneficiaries of the estate are); Estate of Bright v. Comm’r, 619 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1980) (in 
a situation in which a decedent spouse owned a 55 percent community property interest in 
company stock with her spouse, the Fifth Circuit rejected applying a family attribution 
principle despite the fact that her 27.5 percent interest was bequeathed to her husband as 
trustee (giving him effective company control with his own 27.5 percent interest), holding 
instead that the decedent spouse’s interest must be valued without regard to her husband’s 
interest in the company).    
47 To capitalize upon these disparate outcomes, virtually every dying person has a 
clear financial incentive to make deathbeds transfers of interests that they hold in their 
closely held businesses.  Even if taxpayers are not successful in making lifetime transfers, 
married taxpayers can effectuate the same transfer tax savings via their testamentary 
planning.  For example, a taxpayer who owns a controlling interest in a business, say 60 
percent, can bequeath 30 percent outright to his spouse and 30 percent in a testamentary 
marital trust for the surviving spouse’s benefit; upon the surviving spouse’s demise, despite 
the fact that both interests in the company are included in the surviving spouse’s estate tax 
return, each 30 percent interest will be valued separately and accorded lack-of-control 
discounts.  See Estate of Mellinger v. Comm’r, 112 T.C. 26 (1999), acq. 1999-35 I.R.B. 314, 
as corrected by Announcement 99-116, 1999-2 C.B. 763; Estate of Bonner v. Comm’r, 84 
F.3d 196 (5th Cir. 1996).  Compare Estate of Fontana v. Comm’r, 118 T.C. 318 (2002) 
(Tax Court unwilling to extend its holding in Mellinger to cases in which the surviving 
spouse held a general power of appointment over the trust (which the Tax Court equated 
with outright ownership)).  
48 Under current law, the establishment of closely held business interests will be 
respected for transfer tax purposes—resulting in discounts in valuing the gift of an interest 
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Indeed, to capitalize on discounts, practitioners typically advise clients to 
“wrap” their assets—even marketable securities—in entities in order to 
erase a significant portion of the underlying value of such assets.49 Put 
differently, narrowing the gift tax base has become an amateur sport of 
sorts in which all wealthy taxpayers are apparently welcome to participate.50 
2. Valuing Trust Contributions 
Certain forms of trusts permit taxpayers to undervalue their gifts, 
further narrowing the gift tax base.  In other words, taxpayers may make 
trust contributions, and, for gift tax purposes, their value is greatly 
diminished.  These trusts typically come in two varieties:  grantor retained 
annuity trusts (GRATs) and qualified personal residence trusts (QPRTs).  
Taxpayers establish these trusts with a singular purpose in mind: to transfer 
wealth free of gift and estate taxes.51 Even though these trusts are 
 
in such an entity—even if the entity was formed solely for tax purposes.  Mitchell M. 
Gans, Deference and Family Limited Partnerships: A Case Study, 39 PHILLIP E. HECKERLING 
INST. ON EST. PLAN. 500 (2005).  Although the IRS has argued that discounts should be 
denied if the taxpayer fails to establish that the entity was formed for a business purpose, 
the courts have been unreceptive. See, e.g., Strangi v. Comm’r, 417 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 
2005); Knight v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 506 (2006). 
49 See generally S. Stacy Eastland, The Art of Making Uncle Sam Your Assignee Instead 
of Your Senior Partner:  The Use of Partnerships in Estate Planning, SK069 ALI-ABA 999 (2005); 
Timothy R. Baumann, Note, Family Limited Partnerships, Trusts, or Limited Liability 
Corporations:  Which Should the Elderly Choose? 3 ELDER L.J. 111 (1995). Eric Thomas Carver, 
Probate Law: A Valuation Primer;  Trends and Techniques for Estate Planners, 77 MICH. BAR J. 
1304 (1998).   
50 The courts have begun to scrutinize these entities more carefully.  For example, 
where marketable securities are contributed, the courts have allowed a more limited 
minority discount.  See, e.g., McCord v. Comm’r, 461 F.3d 614 (5th Cir. 2006), rev’g 120 
T.C. 358 (2003); Lappo v. Comm’r, T.C.Memo. 2003-258; Peracchio v. Comm’r, 
T.C.Memo. 2003-280; Dallas v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2006-212. In addition, in some 
cases, the courts have denied any discount on the basis of Code section 2036, see supra 
note 38, or on the ground that the assets transferred to the entity have been gifted, in 
substance, to other family members.  See, e.g., Senda v. Comm’r, T.C.Memo. 2004-160. 
But see Kelley v. Comm’r, T.C.Memo 2005-235 (reaching a different outcome; 
distinguishing the Tax Court’s holding in Peraccchio based, in part, on concession made by 
the IRS’s expert witness).   For a more detailed discussion on this point, see Mitchell M. 
Gans & Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Family Limited Partnership Formation: Dueling Dicta, __ 
CAPITAL L. REV. __ (forthcoming).   
51 Taxpayers do not form these trusts for the traditional reasons, such as to 
safeguard designated beneficiaries from financial vicissitudes (e.g., a spendthrift trust (see 
SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 151 (4th ed. 2001))), to eliminate ancillary jurisdiction (e.g., a 
revocable trust (see id. § 330)), or to benefit an eleemosynary institution (e.g., a charitable 
trust (see id. § 348)).  
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established strictly with a tax-savings agenda in mind, the Code explicitly 
authorizes them.   
Congress itself is inadvertently responsible for providing taxpayers 
with the trust “tools” that they now use to chisel away at the gift tax base.  
In an attempt to preclude taxpayers from running roughshod over the 
valuation process, Congress added chapter 14 to the Code.52 This relatively 
new Code chapter, entitled “Special Valuation Rules,” was intended to offer 
certainty and clarity to the transfer tax valuation process, where there was a 
previously perceived void.53 Yet, after the enactment of Chapter 14, 
taxpayers could exploit certain forms of trust that the Code itself now 
specifically sanctioned.  And that is, of course, exactly what taxpayers did.   
Two forms of trust found in chapter 14, both sanctioned under 
Code section 2702, are emblematic of how taxpayers turned a seeming 
defense against gift tax valuation abuse into a Maginot Line.  Under Code 
section 2702, taxpayers may establish GRATs or QPRTs.  For the moment, 
without delving into the complex technical aspects of each trust form 
 
52 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11602, 
104 Stat. 490–91.  
53 By way of background, in the early 1980s taxpayers had devised many so-called 
estate tax “freezes,” i.e., techniques that allowed taxpayers to simultaneously transfer 
wealth, retain control, and minimize their transfer tax burdens.  See generally Byrle M. 
Abbin, The Value-Capping Cafeteria—Selecting the Appropriate Freeze Technique, 15 U. MIAMI 
INST. EST. PLAN. ch. 20, at 2014 (1981).  One technique in particular, the establishment of 
grantor retained income trusts (GRITs), allowed many taxpayers to achieve far superior 
results than had they made outright gifts.  Harry F. Lee, The Economics of a GRIT, 68 TAXES 
555 (1990); Mitchell Gans, GRITS, GRATS AND GRUTS: Planning and Policy, 11 VA. TAX 
L. REV. 761 (1992). To foreclose this transfer tax planning opportunity and many other 
perceived estate tax freeze abuses, in 1987 Congress responded by adding section 2036(c) 
to the Code.  Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 
10402(a), 10 Stat. 1330, 1330–431.  This Code section was specifically targeted to preclude 
taxpayers from utilizing such valuation stratagems.  See Joseph M. Dodge, Rethinking Section 
2036(c), 49 TAX NOTES 199 (Oct. 8, 1990); Thomas Earl Geu, Selected Estate Planning Aspects 
of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (2001), 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 735, 768 (2004) (“The 
purpose of the old (and repealed) section 2036(c) was to prevent abusive techniques used 
to freeze the estate value for purposes of the estate tax.”).  Code section 2036(c), however, 
proved difficult to administer and hard to comprehend.  See 136 CONG. REC. S15.680 
(daily ed. Oct. 18, 1990) (the section's "complexity, breadth, and vagueness" caused "an 
unreasonable impediment to the transfer of family businesses . . . [and] . . . many taxpayers 
[had] refrained from legitimate intrafamily transactions because of uncertainty about the 
scope of its rules.”).  Several years later, after an avalanche of complaints (JOINT COMM.
ON TAXATION, 101 ST CONG., 2D SESS., PRESENT LAW AND PROPOSALS RELATING TO 
FEDERAL TRANSFER TAX CONSEQUENCES OF ESTATE FREEZES 24–25 (Comm.Print 
1990), Congress repealed Code section 2036(c).  Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11601, 104 Stat. 490–91 (repealed former I.R.C. § 2036(c)). 
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(which will be discussed in section III.C.),54 GRATs and QPRTs allow 
taxpayers to make gargantuan trust contributions that, when properly 
structured, for gift tax purposes are deemed Lilliputian in nature.55 
In selecting assets to contribute to GRATs, taxpayers will actively 
select those assets that they think will outperform the applicable Code 
 
54 For those readers who are anxious to know the details of a GRAT and QPRT, 
consider illustrations of how each of these trusts operates. 
Illustration #1—GRAT: At a time when the applicable federal rate under Code 
section 7520 is 5 percent, a taxpayer contributes title to rapidly appreciating real estate 
worth $1 million to a GRAT that has a two-year term, retaining the right to receive back 
from the trust a $550,000 annual annuity.  Because of the taxpayer’s sizable retained 
interest (i.e., the right to receive two $550,000 annuity payments), Code section 2702 and 
the regulations promulgated thereunder indicate that the value of the taxpayer’s retained 
interest is $1 million.  That being the case, the value of the remainder interest deemed 
passing to the trust remainder beneficiaries is $0 ($1 million contribution less the taxpayer’s 
$1 million retained interest).  If, over the two-year trust period, the contributed real estate 
appreciates by more than 5 percent, any monies or property remaining in the trust after the 
two-year termination period will pass transfer tax–free to the trust remainder beneficiaries. 
Illustration #2—QPRT: At a time when the applicable federal rate under Code 
section 7520 is 5 percent, a taxpayer contributes title to her home, worth $1 million, to a 
QPRT that has a twenty-year term, retaining the right to the trust’s income (which, in this 
case, constitutes a right to reside in the home free of paying any rent).  Pursuant to Code 
section 2702, the value of the taxpayer’s retained interest would equal $900,000, and the 
value of the remainder interest passing to the trust remainder beneficiaries is accordingly 
$100,000 ($1 million value of the contributed house less the taxpayer’s $900,000 retained 
interest).   Thus, at the termination of the QPRT, the remainder beneficiaries will receive 
the house with a likely value of $1 million or more even though the taxpayer is deemed to 
have made a taxable gift of only $100,000.  If the value of the house remains constant, the 
remainder beneficiaries would receive a house with a value of $1 million at the QPRT’s 
termination.  If, as is more likely case, the house appreciates during the QPRT’s term, the 
remainder beneficiaries will also enjoy that appreciation as well.   
If, conversely, the value of the house should decline, the advantages that the 
QPRT offers are reduced.  To illustrate, assume that at the QPRT’s termination, the value 
of the house was $0; in such a case, the taxpayer would have used up $100,000 of his 
lifetime gift tax exemption without effecting a transfer of any wealth.  In this situation, a 
more favorable outcome could have been achieved had the taxpayer, in lieu of establishing 
the QPRT and funding it, made an outright asset transfer of equivalent value (i.e., 
$100,000) that produced a positive economic return. 
55 In contrast to outright gifts, taxpayers who establish QPRTs and GRATs incur 
a risk that they may not survive the term of the trust, and, if they do not, estate tax 
inclusion occurs under Code section 2036 (or in the case of a GRAT, under Code section 
2039).  Rev.. Rul. 82-105, 1982-2 C.B. 133; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-45-035 (Aug. 13, 1993); Priv. 
Ltr. Rul. 2002-10-009 (Nov. 19, 2001).  For a discussion of strategies that possibly 
eliminate this Code section 2036 risk, see Jonathan G. Blattmachr & Andrew D. Painter, 
Planning for Split-Interest Transfers Under the Section 2702 Final Regulation, 77 J. TAX’N 18 (2002). 
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section 7520 rates (these rates, promulgated monthly, fluctuate with the 
midterm federal interest rates and are designed to pinpoint the value of 
taxpayers’ retained interests).56 And, as will be shown, if the taxpayers’ 
choice of trust contributions proves misguided, there is little downside risk 
to the taxpayer.57 
In determining whether to contribute their primary residences or 
vacation homes to a QPRT, taxpayers will select those properties that have 
the most likely chance to appreciate (rather than depreciate) in value.58 
Taxpayers who choose wisely in their trust contributions will be richly 
rewarded:  they are able to gift enormous amounts of wealth to trust 
remainder beneficiaries at greatly discounted values.59 
56 See Treas. Reg. § 20.7520-1(b) (“Prescribes that the pertinent rate is 120 
percent of the midterm applicable rate, using annual compounding, rounded to the nearest 
two-tenths of one percent.”).  
57 Put differently, for gift tax purposes, taxpayers take the position that they can 
have a retained interest in the contributed trust property that equals the fair market value 
of the contributed trust property, negating any taxable gift.  See Walton v. Comm’r, 115 
T.C. 589 (2000) (in a unanimous decision, the Tax Court struck down a regulation that did 
not treat payments made to a grantor’s estate (if the grantor died during the course of the 
trust term) as a retained interest).  By issuing new regulations, the IRS has subsequently 
acquiesced in the outcome of the Walton decision.  These regulations permit taxpayers to 
treat as a retained interest annuity payments that continue to be paid to their estates if they 
die during the term of the trust. Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2702-2(a)(5), 25.2702-3(e), ex. 5.  
Nevertheless, in separate guidance issued prior to the promulgation of this regulation, the 
IRS has remarked that GRAT arrangements in which "the value of the remainder interest 
(and thus, the amount of the gift) is zero or of nominal value . . . [are] contrary to the 
principles of § 2702."  Tech. Adv. Mem. 2002-45-053 (Nov. 8, 2002).  This remark signifies 
the unsettled nature of this area of the law and the fact that the IRS may still challenge 
practitioners’ use of so called zeroed-out GRATs.  
58 As always, the advantages of making a contribution to a QPRT must be 
weighed against making an outright gift of the same property.  Consider, for example, if 
the same $1 million home presented in the text were instead gifted outright to the people 
who were to be the remainder trust beneficiaries.  Over the same twenty-year period, the 
beneficiaries could charge the taxpayer fair market value rent for residing in the property, 
the title to which they now own.  The higher the fair market value rent they can charge, the 
more attractive the outright gift becomes relative to the contribution to the QPRT; 
conversely, the lower the fair market value rent they can charge, the less attractive the 
outright gift becomes relative to the contribution to the QPRT.  Another comparative 
advantage of the outright gift is that the death of the donor will not cause any subsequent 
estate tax inclusion; in the case of the QPRT, however, should the donor die anytime 
during the retained trust term, the entire fair market value of the residence (including any 
appreciation therein) becomes taxable in the donor’s gross estate.  I.R.C. § 2036.  For a 
further discussion of the advantages of a QPRT, see Mitchell M. Gans, GRIT's, GRAT's 
and GRUT's: Planning and Policy, 11 VA. TAX REV. 761 (1992). 
 59 See Lawrence F. Katzenstein, Running the Numbers: An Economic Analysis of 
GRATS and QPRTS, SL078 ALI-ABA 779, 781 (2006) (“Grantor retained annuity trusts 
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B. Reporting and Penalty Systems 
Notwithstanding the “voluntary” nature of our nation’s tax system, 
it works for a variety of reasons.  One reason that compliance is relatively 
high is that taxpayers believe that if they are noncompliant, the IRS will 
uncover their transgression and impose civil as well as possible criminal 
sanctions.60 When it comes to the gift tax, however, many taxpayers do not 
harbor these same fears because (1) they know their chances of being 
caught are infinitesimally small and, even if they are caught, (2) they are not 
likely to be penalized.    
 
1. The IRS’s Inability to Detect Noncompliance 
With respect to its ability to detect taxpayer noncompliance, the 
odds are deeply stacked against the IRS, particularly when it comes to 
transgressions with respect to the gift tax.   As a general proposition, the 
IRS is a beleaguered administrative agency.  As an agency, the IRS is 
woefully underfunded, and, over the past several years, the scope of its 
responsibilities has been greatly expanded.61 This anemic funding coupled 
with the augmentation of the agency’s responsibilities has severely 
hampered the IRS’s ability to monitor taxpayer compliance, as evidenced by 
the paltry number of annual income tax audits that the IRS presently 
conducts.62 
("GRATs") and qualified personal residence trusts ("QPRTs") have become standard 
weapons in the estate planner's arsenal.”). 
60 JCT Reviews IRS Plans, Budget, 2005 TNT 95-13 (JCX-35-05) (May 17, 2005) 
(Doc 2005-10883) (“In a recently released survey, 51 percent of taxpayers identified fear of 
an audit as having either a great deal of influence or somewhat of an influence on whether 
they report and pay their taxes honestly.”)  See generally, Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and 
Punishment in Taxation:  Deceit, Deterrence, and the Self-Adjusting Rule, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 569 
(2006).   
61 Indeed, Congress has charged the IRS with the responsibility to monitor and 
administer many social welfare programs, including the earned income tax credit for low-
income wage earners.  Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Collision of Tax and Welfare Politics: The 
Political History of the Earned Income Tax Credit, 1969-99, 53 NAT’L TAX J. 983 (2000).  More 
recently, the IRS has been called upon to administer disaster relief.  Meredith M. Stead, 
Implementing Disaster Relief Through Tax Expenditures:  An Assessment of the Katrina Emergency 
Tax Relief Measures, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2158 (2006). 
62 See GAO, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE: ASSESSMENT OF THE FISCAL YEAR 
2006 BUDGET REQUEST (GAO-05-566) 11 (Apr. 27, 2005) (IRS audit rates declined 
steeply from 1995 to 1999, but the audit rate has slowly increased since 2000). 
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When it comes to gift tax reporting practices, the situation is 
particularly bleak.  Just last year, the IRS decided to halve the number of 
staff personnel in its estate and gift tax audit branch,63 metaphorically 
keeping its fingers crossed that taxpayers will be compliant.  This strategy, 
however, does not appear to be working (i.e., compliance with the gift tax 
appears to be ebbing).64
In the case of income taxes, a wide array of third-party information-
reporting requirements is in place to ensure compliance.  If taxpayers earn 
wages, their employers must report such earnings on a Form W-2;65 if 
taxpayers receive interest income on an investment, the payer must report 
such income on a Form 1099-INT;66 if taxpayers sell securities, the broker 
must report the amounts realized from these sales on a Form 1099-B.67 
These examples are but a smattering of all the information returns the Code 
requires third parties to provide in order to bolster income tax 
compliance.68 The issuance of such information returns is not for naught:  
empirical studies repeatedly indicate that the issuance of these third-party 
information returns plays a critical role in ensuring taxpayer compliance.69 
63 Allen Kenny, IRS Plans Significant Cuts to Estate Tax Program, 2006 TAX NOTES 
TODAY 141-1 (July 24, 2006).  See David Cay Johnston, I.R.S. Will Cut Tax Lawyers Who 
Audit the Richest, N.Y. TIMES A16 (July 23, 2006) (reports that  
the federal government is moving to eliminate the jobs of nearly half of 
the lawyers at the Internal Revenue Service who audit tax returns of some 
of the wealthiest Americans, specifically those who are subject to gift and 
estate taxes when they transfer parts of their fortunes to their children and 
others). 
64 See DAVID JOULFAIAN, THE FEDERAL GIFT TAX: HISTORY, LAW, AND 
ECONOMICS (Jan. 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=940871  (presents evidence 
that compliance with the gift tax has been lackluster); JONATHAN FEINSTEIN & CHIH-
CHIN HO, IRS, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, THE IRS RESEARCH BULLETIN, PUB. 1500, (rev. 
11-99) 39–45 (estimating that approximately one-half of all gift tax payments are evaded). 
65 Treas. Reg. § 1.6041-2(a). 
66 Treas. Reg. § 1.6049-4. 
67 Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1. 
68 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6050A—6050T (providing a laundry list of instances when 
information returns must be filed). 
69 See IRS Releases Fact Sheet on Third Party Reporting, 2006 TNT 170-22 (Sept. 1, 
2006) ([E]xperience shows that taxpayers are much more likely to report their income 
when they receive third-party notification of payments they received.”); Tax Gap: Many 
Actions Taken, but a Cohesive Compliance Strategy Needed, GAO/GGD 94-123, at 5 (May 11, 
1994), available at http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat3/151585.pdf ("Information returns are a 
proven way to promote compliance and help IRS find noncompliance."); Michael C. 
Durst, Report of the Second Invitational Conference on Income Tax Compliance, 42 TAX LAW. 705, 
709 (1989) ("Computer-based enforcement techniques, relying largely on information 
returns filed by payers of wages, interest, dividends, and other items, have provided 
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In the case of estate taxes, third parties, namely an estate’s 
executors, are required to file an estate tax return (Form 706) with the IRS.  
In most instances, this reporting obligation creates a self-policing 
mechanism: an estate’s executors will not ordinarily risk bearing civil 
penalties or possible criminal prosecution to save tax dollars that inure to 
others (i.e., the estate’s beneficiaries).   The only situation when this self-
policing mechanism is not operative is when an estate’s executors are also 
the estate’s sole beneficiaries (in which case the executors’ questionable tax-
savings reporting positions, if not audited, do inure to their personal 
benefit).70
When it comes to gift tax enforcement, however, the issuance of 
any third-party information returns is noticeably absent, and there is no 
self-policing mechanism in place.  Consider that current reporting practices 
require taxpayers who make gifts to nonspousal beneficiaries in excess of 
the annual gift tax exclusion (currently, $12,000) to file a gift tax return.71 
Yet, there are no mechanisms in place to ensure that taxpayers will comply 
with their filing obligations.  The burden of accurately reporting gifts falls 
entirely to the taxpayer, and, when it comes to self-reporting, it is 
empirically well-known and documented that taxpayers often fall short of 
the required compliance mark.72 
Aside from the absence of third-party information return issuance, 
there is another major distinction between income and gift taxes.  Most 
taxpayers actively or passively earn income (e.g., wages, interest, and 
dividends) and, accordingly, must annually file an income tax return.  The 
IRS therefore has reason to consider virtually every person an audit target; 
indeed, the very absence of a tax return submission (or a tax return 
submission that reflects an exceedingly low amount of income) might, in 
and of itself, trigger an income tax audit.  Thus, random income tax audits 
play an important role not only to instill taxpayer compliance but also to 
generate revenue.   
 
valuable benefits by virtually eliminating noncompliance with respect to important 
categories of income.").  
70 See Estate of Trompeter v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2004-27, aff’d, 97 AFTR 2d 
2006-1447 (9th Cir. 2006) (the concealment of assets by the estate’s executors, who also 
were the estate’s beneficiaries, resulted in application of fraud penalty). 
71 I.R.C. § 6019.  
72 See, e.g., Piroska Soos, Self-Employed Evasion and Tax Withholding: A Comparative 
Study and Analysis of the Issues, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 107, 113–20 (1990) (discussing the 
level of low compliance among self-employed individuals who do not receive information 
returns).   
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In the sphere of the gift tax, random audits cannot play this same 
important compliance role.  There are several reasons for this.  First, 
random gift tax audits would likely be perceived as highly intrusive (and 
thus politically unacceptable).  Second, due to the lifetime gift tax 
exemption (currently, $1 million), random audits would not likely generate 
any immediate revenue.73 Third, many forms of gifts can be readily 
camouflaged (e.g., paying to have a child’s house remodeled), making the 
random audit process extraordinarily difficult.  
Collusion is the final factor that contributes to the IRS’s inability to 
detect noncompliance.  The act of gift giving usually involves one person 
making a gratuitous asset transfer to a blood relative or a person of close 
kinship.  The closeness of this relationship, as well as the recipient’s 
gratitude, makes it unlikely that the recipient would act against the donor’s 
interest.  Put differently, recipients of gifts, hoping to accede to additional 
wealth in the future, are likely to assist in the noncompliance process by 
using gifted cash, for example, to pay for an expensive family vacation in 
order to avoid leaving an “asset trail” or, alternatively, not selling a gifted 
asset for several years in order to cloud its gift date’s fair market value.  
Contrast the cooperative spirit between the gift giver and recipient with that 
between the typical employer and employee:  in the latter relationship, the 
employer is usually inclined to be forthright in its reporting practices 
because it usually doesn’t have a sense of affinity with its employees such 
that it is willing to commit acts of indiscretion on their behalf.74 
73 Albeit upon the donor’s death, the use of some or all of his lifetime gift tax 
exemption would result in a correspondingly higher estate tax burden. 
74 The collusive atmosphere that exists between donors and donees is far less 
likely to occur between an estate’s representatives and an estate’s beneficiaries.  The 
probate or administration process usually involves many sets of eyes.  For starters, when 
taxpayers die, usually a public record is made of their death and, depending on governing 
state court rules, the value of the estate’s assets must be disclosed.  (That is, compliance 
with the probate process is ordinarily fairly accurate because executors, personal 
representatives, and administrators do not want to run afoul of state court rules and 
procedures.)  In addition, in circumstances when an estate has multiple beneficiaries, each 
wants to make sure that he/she receives his/her fair share of the estate’s assets and no 
other beneficiary disproportionately receives more; in the estate administration process, 
informal and formal accountings are thus commonplace.  As a result, in their tax reporting 
practices, an estate’s executors are prone to be forthright to both estate beneficiaries and 
the government or risk either being surcharged for violation of their fiduciary duties or 
incurring delinquent tax penalties.    
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2. The Inadequacies of the Existing Penalty 
Structure 
On paper, taxpayers who file inaccurate gift tax returns, disregard 
their gift tax filing obligations, or fail to pay the gift tax they owe do so at 
great peril.  The failure to accurately report the value of a gift is subject to 
an accuracy-related penalty of 20 percent on the amount of tax due,75 the 
failure-to-file penalty is 5 percent per month of the amount of the gift tax 
due (up to a maximum of 25 percent),76 and the failure to timely pay is 
subject to a 0.5 percent per month penalty on the amount of the tax due 
(up to a maximum of 25 percent).77 
But application of each of the foregoing penalties is predicated 
upon there being an actual gift tax due.78 In the absence of a gift tax being 
due, there can consequently be no accuracy-related penalty, failure-to-file 
penalty, or failure-to-pay penalty.  Thus, in a world where most taxpayers 
do not ordinarily make gifts that exceed their annual gift tax exclusion 
(currently, $12,000) or their lifetime gift tax exemption of $1 million, there 
is virtually no chance of any of the foregoing penalties applying.   
Even in those instances when the IRS uncovers a situation of gift 
tax filing noncompliance, it has virtually no incentive to pursue the matter.  
Because of the lifetime gift tax exemption of $1 million,79 there are few 
instances when taxpayers’ gifts will yield immediate tax dollars (i.e., the 
aggregate amount of taxable gifts exceed the taxpayer’s lifetime gift tax 
exemption of $1 million).  The only things that a gift tax audit will thus 
ordinarily produce are two possibilities:  (i) if and when the taxpayer makes 
additional taxable gifts sometime in the near or distant future, potential gift 
tax will be due; or (ii) when the taxpayer subsequently dies one, two, three, 
four, or five decades down the road, the gift tax audit that resulted in the 
partial depletion of the taxpayer’s lifetime gift tax exemption will ultimately 
result in the possibility of additional estate tax being due.80 These kinds of 
 
75 See I.R.C. § 6662(b)(5) (applies when the value of any property claimed on a 
gift tax return is 50 percent or less of the amount determined to be correct); see also I.R.C. 
§ 6662(h) (the accuracy-related penalty is doubled to 40 percent in cases in which there is a 
gross valuation misstatement (i.e.,  the value of any property claimed on a gift tax return is 
25 percent or less of the amount determined to be correct)). 
76 I.R.C. § 6651(a)(1). 
77 I.R.C. § 6651(a)(2). 
78 See operative language of the statutes cited in supra notes 75, 76, and 77.   
79 I.R.C. § 2505.  
80 Due to the availability of the unlimited estate tax marital deduction (I.R.C. § 
2056(a)), this deferral of transfer tax liability can sometimes exceed a half century or more.   
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audit “payoffs”—in which the term pay is truly a misnomer—are unlikely to 
spur IRS personnel to be too vigilant in the audit process.   
Consider the plight of a taxpayer who makes a significant gift, say 
$500,000, in 2007; purposely fails to file a gift tax return; and, a decade or 
two later, conveniently “forgets” that he made this earlier gift.  If the 
taxpayer makes another significant taxable gift (i.e., in excess of the annual 
gift tax exclusion), or, alternatively, the taxpayer dies and the taxpayer’s 
executors fail to report this prior gift (perhaps because they, themselves, are 
unaware that this gift was ever made), the most likely outcome is that this 
taxpayer’s selective amnesia will not be detected by the IRS.   
Certainly, duplicitous taxpayers, such as the one described in the 
prior paragraph who egregiously flaunt the law, deserve to be penalized.  
But even in the unlikely event that such transgressions are uncovered, the 
IRS’s only recourse would be to assess a gift tax.  Because, however, in the 
vast majority of cases, no gift tax would actually be due (assuming the 
taxpayer had not used his lifetime gift tax exemption of $1 million), no 
penalties or interest would apply.  Evident from this one example is that as 
a result of their gift tax derelictions, taxpayers who are irresponsible or act 
fraudulently will likely not suffer any grim repercussions. 
As a practical matter, as just indicated, penalizing taxpayers who 
don’t fulfill their gift tax obligations will be a rarity indeed.  Even rarer will 
be those instances when criminal prosecutions relating to the gift tax would 
be undertaken (i.e., the government would have sufficient evidence to 
prove that the taxpayer had the requisite mens rea to criminally defeat the 
gift tax). Although even the failure to file a gift tax return when one is due 
constitutes a misdemeanor,81 there is not a single reported case where the 
IRS commenced a criminal indictment in the context of the gift tax. 
The dearth of cases in which the IRS has successfully brought civil 
penalties and criminal sanctions reflects the sad state of affairs when it 
comes to the gift tax penalty structure.  What are the implications of having 
a tax in place that lacks a viable penalty structure?  The literature is replete 
with studies that indicate that penalties function as a strong deterrent 
against taxpayer noncompliance.82 These same studies likewise reveal a 
 
81 I.R.C. § 7203.  See, e.g., Bickham Lincoln-Mercury Inc. v. United States, 168 
F.3d 790, 793 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that failure to file a form required for the receipt of 
cash is a criminal violation under I.R.C. § 7203). 
82 See generally, Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in 
Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453 (2003); WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES (Joel Slemrod ed., 
1992).  Other commentators argue that social norms play a more important role in tax 
compliance than do tax penalties.  Brian Erard & Jonathan S. Feinstein, The Role of Moral 
Sentiments and Audit Perceptions in Tax Compliance, PUB. FIN. PUBLIQUES 70 (1994); P.F. 
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converse axiom, namely, the absence of an effective penalty structure can 
undermine taxpayer compliance.83 The practical implications of not having 
a penalty structure in place are thus clear:  the gift tax is essentially rendered 
a nullity.    
In the end, the gift tax is concededly a counterintuitive tax:  
Taxpayers who make gifts do not expect to be burdened with paying a tax 
for engaging in such altruistic acts.84 Indeed, few taxpayers appreciate the 
fact that the gift tax plays a critical role in the tax system and that without it, 
both the estate and income tax systems are at risk of being undermined.   In 
the absence of a viable penalty system, counterintuitive taxes are particularly 
vulnerable to taxpayer noncompliance.85 With respect to the gift tax, that is 
exactly the situation as it exists today. 
 
C. Reverse Alchemy and the Process of Making Wealth 
(Temporarily) Disappear 
In the sphere of estate planning, how does wealth temporarily 
disappear (for gift tax reporting purposes) and then miraculously reappear 
in the hands of donees?86 One look at practitioners’ journals reveals that 
most taxpayers, to minimize their gift tax obligations, are instructed to use 
one or more of the following planning techniques:  (1) form a family 
limited partnership,87 (2) establish a QPRT,88 and/or (3) transfer rapidly 
 
Gordon, Individual Morality and Reputation Costs as Deterrents to Tax Evasion, 33 EUR. ECON.
REV. 797 (1989). 
83 Michael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion:  A Theoretical 
Analysis, 1 J. PUB. ECON. 323 (1972). 
84 As such, if the IRS detects acts of noncompliance, taxpayers do not usually risk 
social ostracism. 
85 See Raskolnikov supra note 60, at 577-78; see also Marjorie E. Kornhauser, 
Doing the Full Monty: Will Publicizing Tax Information Increase Compliance?, 18 CAN. J.L. &
JURISPRUDENCE 95, 97 (2005) (indicating that where taxpayers perceive a tax as unjust, 
compliance will decline). 
86 Professor James Repetti creatively used the term alchemy to describe this 
process.  James R. Repetti, Minority Discounts:  The Alchemy in Estate and Gift Taxation, 50 
TAX L. REV. 415 (1995). 
87 See, e.g., Manigault & Hodges, Valuation Discounts—An Analysis of the Service's 
Position Compared with Litigated Cases, 91 J. TAX’N 26 (1999) (“Therefore, unless the willing 
buyer/willing seller test in the Regulations is changed, discounts must continue to be 
allowed in valuing property interests because the discounts aid in properly measuring 
FMV.”); Ira S. Feldman, Ensure Family Limited Partnerships Work on All Fronts, 75 PRAC. TAX 
STRATEGIES 226 (OCT. 2005) (“The professional ‘buzz’ is all about family limited 
partnerships.”); James R. Hamill & Donald W. Stout, Valuation Discounts for Intrafamily 
Transfers, 59 TAX’N FOR ACCT. 75 (AUG. 1997) (points out that by structuring transfers 
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appreciating property into a GRAT.89 The long-standing stature of these 
techniques in the field of estate planning speaks loudly of their viability and 
success. 
To illustrate the transfer tax–reducing power of each of these 
techniques, consider the options of an unmarried taxpayer who has $5 
million of assets and three adult children and who wishes to minimize her 
gift tax burdens.   
The first option is that the taxpayer takes, say, $3 million in 
marketable securities that she owns and contributes them to a newly 
formed family limited partnership in which she will hold a 99 percent 
limited partnership interest, with one of her children holding the 1 percent 
general partnership interest.90 The taxpayer would then make annual 
exclusion gifts of limited partnership interests to her children.91 For 
valuation purposes, because the limited partnership interests that are gifted 
represent a noncontrolling interest in the entity, a minority discount would 
be permitted (probably in the 15 percent to 25 percent range).   
Next, the taxpayer could transfer her $1 million personal residence 
into a QPRT.  The terms of the QPRT are as follows:  It is to exist for a 
term of twenty years. At the end of this twenty-year period, the assets of 
the QPRT will be held in trust for the benefit of the taxpayer’s children 
until the taxpayer’s death. (Having these trust provisions essentially allows 
the taxpayer to reside in her personal residence as a trust beneficiary or as a 
rent-paying tenant for the balance of her life.) The transfer is made when 
the applicable federal rate is 7 percent.  Under this set of assumptions, 
contributing title to her personal residence to the QPRT will result in a 
 
through family limited partnerships, taxpayers can qualify for valuation discounts that 
produce significant gift tax savings). 
88 See, e.g., James R. Hamill, Personal Residence Trusts Can Reduce Transfer Taxes, 55 
TAX’N FOR ACCT. 73 (Aug. 1995) (elaborates upon the reasons why personal residence 
trusts offer advantages over transfers of other types of property with retained income 
rights). 
89 See e.g., Carlyn S. McCaffrey, Lloyd Leva Plaine & Pam H. Schneider, The 
After-Math of Walton:  The Rehabilitation of the Fixed-Term, Zeroed-Out GRAT, 95 J. TAX’N 325 
(DEC. 2001) (“The fixed-term, zeroed-out GRAT is an extremely valuable estate planning 
tool for individuals who want to transfer property to family members without paying gift 
tax.”). 
90 This is a similar structure to that used by the taxpayer in Jones v. Commissioner,
116 T.C. 121 (2001).  For a discussion of the continuing viability of the Jones decision, see, 
Gans & Blattmachr, supra note 50, at __. 
91 I.R.C. § 2503(b) (currently, $12,000). 
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$200,000 reportable gift.92 No gift tax will be owed, however, because of 
the taxpayer’s lifetime gift tax exemption. 
Finally, the taxpayer establishes a GRAT.  (If it provides the reader 
of this paragraph any solace, most taxpayers who establish GRATs 
comprehend little about the intricacies of their operations, recognizing only 
the resultant gift tax savings such trusts offer.)   The taxpayer will be the 
GRAT’s sole trustee, and she will contribute her $1 million of remaining 
assets.  The GRAT is to exist for a two-year term, and the annuity payout 
rate is set at $555,833.30; given these terms and the governing Code section 
7520 rate of 7 percent, the value of the remainder interest passing to the 
taxpayer’s children (which constitutes a taxable gift) is deemed to be $0.  
Therefore, as long as some GRAT principal remains at the end of its two-
year term, it can pass free of gift tax to the taxpayer’s children.  (For 
example, if the GRAT produces a 10 percent return of income and 10 
percent growth on its assets, $226,412.57 will remain for the trustee to 
distribute to the taxpayer’s children at the end of the trust term.)93 
An overall examination of these strategies illustrates the success of 
this reverse alchemy process.  When the taxpayer started the estate planning 
process, she had a net wealth of $5 million.  By utilizing this series of 
planning techniques—abracadabra!—for gift tax reporting purposes she 
could legitimately report transferring a much smaller figure.94 The 
taxpayer’s ability to magically transform her “gold” into coal, at least on a 
temporary basis, is not considered overly aggressive estate tax planning; to 
the contrary, it is sanctioned under the Code95 and by the courts.96 
92 The actual figure for a fifty-year-old taxpayer making such a gift is $199,630.  
For heuristic reasons, we have upwardly rounded this figure. 
93 The taxpayer may repeat this GRAT contribution process every two years; 
thus, whatever annuity amount is paid by the GRAT to the taxpayer (in this case, the two 
payments of $555,833.30) is rolled back into a new two-year GRAT.  See, e.g., Dan W. 
Holbrook & Daniel P. Murphy, Two-Year, Overlapping GRATs Can Maximize the Benefits of 
Split-Interest Transfers, 78 J. OF TAX’N 154 (1993) (“Despite some estate planning risks and 
limitations, including the requirement that the property's average annual rate of return 
exceed the IRS discount rate, GRATs continue to provide a means of making tax-free inter 
vivos transfers of appreciating or income-producing property.”)  Via this so-called “rolling 
GRAT” process, the taxpayer’s children will ultimately receive the entire $1 million that 
the taxpayer contributed to the initial GRAT.   
94 Note, however, if the taxpayer dies during the term of the QPRT or the 
GRAT, some or all of the transfer tax savings associated with the use of these techniques 
may vanish.  See supra note 55.  
95 I.R.C. §§  2512, 2702.  
96 The discount for a minority interest accounts for the inability of a shareholder 
to control or influence decisions in a closely held corporation. See Ward v. Comm’r, 87 
T.C. 78, 106 (1986); Estate of Stevens v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2000-53.   For discounts to 
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For gift tax reporting purposes, the transfer of family limited 
partnership interests, the contribution of title to her personal residence to a 
QPRT, and the GRAT contribution each constitutes a taxable event.  Yet, 
consider the implications if the taxpayer decides not to file a gift tax return.  
As previously indicated,97 because no gift tax is actually due with respect to 
any of the foregoing transfers, no penalties would be imposed.  At worst, 
even if the IRS miraculously were able to detect that no gift tax return had 
been filed, the statute of limitations would remain open for valuation 
purposes.98 This is but a very small potential price to pay for such 
tremendous dereliction on the taxpayer’s part.   
______________________________________________ 
Over the past three decades, the atmosphere in the Beltway toward 
the gift and estate taxes has largely been one of utter contempt.99 In the 
past several years, rarely a week has gone by that another elected 
representative hasn’t called for the repeal of these transfer taxes.100 This 
hostility toward transfer taxes (pejoratively labeled “death taxes”) has likely 
translated into diminished taxpayer compliance.  After all, if those who 
govern have expressed such moral outrage at the supposed unfairness of 
transfer taxes, taxpayers would certainly feel justified in circumventing (or 
ignoring) their transfer tax obligations.  The effect of these repeated calls 
for estate tax repeal and the closeness of the relationship between the gift 
tax and the estate tax have no doubt enervated IRS personnel who conduct 
gift tax audits and who know that the bounty of their work may ultimately 
prove hollow, particularly in the absence of a viable estate tax. 
In light of the systemic problems that have beset the gift tax, the 
question thrust upon Congress’s doorstep is not if something should be 
 
account for a business interest’s lack of marketability, see, e.g., Estate of Jones v. Comm’r, 
116 T.C. 121 (2001) (allowing an 8 percent marketability discount on an 83.08 percent 
controlling interest); Estate of Maggos v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-129 (allowing a 
25 percent illiquidity discount on a 56.7 percent interest conveying effective operational 
control); Estate of Hendrickson v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1999-278 (allowing a 30 percent 
marketability discount on a 49.97 percent effectively controlling interest). 
97 See supra notes 75–78 and accompanying text.  
98 I.R.C. § 6501(c)(3).  Even if a gift tax return is filed, if inadequate disclosure is 
made, the statute of limitations also remains open with respect to that item.  Treas. Reg. § 
301.6501(c)-1(e)(1). 
99 See generally, Nona A. Toto, CRS Updates Report on 109th Congress Estate Tax 
Bills, 2006 TNT 162-15 (July 31, 2006); Jane G. Gravelle, CRS Updates Analysis of Estate and 
Gift Tax Economic Issues, 2006 TNT 134-23 (July 13, 2006). 
100 Id.
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done, but rather what that something should be.  Part IV suggests 
appropriate reforms.  
 
IV. REFORMS TO REINVIGORATE THE GIFT TAX 
Congress needs to reform the gift tax so that it can fulfill its historic 
missions of safeguarding the integrities of the estate and income tax 
regimes.  Failure to institute the appropriate reform measures not only 
destines the gift tax to founder but also jeopardizes the fate of the income 
and estate taxes.  Congress should therefore (A) craft legislation to broaden 
the base of the gift tax and (B) institute better reporting and penalty 
systems to ensure improved taxpayer compliance. 
 
A. Broadening the Gift Tax Base  
Currently, the valuation process saps the gift tax of its vitality and 
relegates it to a largely voluntary tax.  In reality, when it comes to gratuitous 
transfers, taxpayers will do everything in their power to preserve the value 
of the assets they intend to transfer to their loved ones; conversely, for gift 
tax reporting purposes, taxpayers will use every conceivable stratagem to 
artificially diminish the value of such transferred assets (at least on a 
temporary basis).  Given a choice between reality and artificiality, the 
former should trump the latter; Congress should thus eliminate (1) the use 
of valuation discounts and (2) the latitude associated with various forms of 
trust instruments.  By instituting these measures, Congress will allow facts, 
not fictions, to dominate the taxability of gratuitous transfers.   
 .
1. Elimination of Valuation Discounts 
For gift tax return reporting purposes, the willing buyer / willing 
seller test accurately values assets such as publicly traded stocks, bonds, and 
the like.  When it comes to valuing closely held business interests, however, 
absent a family attribution principle that accounts for the interrelationships 
between and among the donor and donees, strict adherence to this test 
results in unrealistically low values.   
Suppose a taxpayer and her husband own 60 percent and 40 
percent, respectively, of the outstanding membership interests of Highly 
Profitable, L.L.C., worth $1 million.  If the taxpayer earns $100,000 from 
her employment efforts at Highly Profitable, L.L.C., the Code appropriately 
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taxes this sum.101 If the same taxpayer decides to transfer a 10 percent 
membership interest in the limited liability company to her daughter, valued 
in the taxpayer’s hands at $100,000, it would seem appropriate, for gift tax 
reporting purposes, that the amount of the reported gift would be 
$100,000.  As previously indicated,102 however, application of the willing 
buyer / willing seller test permits lack-of-control and marketability 
discounts so that the 10 percent membership interest would likely be valued 
anywhere between $70,000 to $30,000, depending upon how aggressively 
the taxpayer (or the taxpayer’s advisor) discounts the membership interest 
to account for its minority status and the fact that the limited liability 
company interest is not traded on a public market.   
Commentators have offered several sensible ways to refine the 
willing buyer / willing seller test in the context of family-controlled 
businesses (defined as those business interests that are not listed on a public 
exchange).103 The one that appears to be the most practicable involves a 
series of three steps. 
The first step would be to use a set of attribution rules (akin to 
those in Code sections 267(b) and 318(a)) to determine what the transferor 
owns, both directly and constructively (i.e., by means of attribution).104 For 
 
101 I.R.C. § 61. 
102 See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text.   
103 See, e.g., JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE 
TAX COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 396–404 (Comm. Print 2005), 
available at www.house.gov/jct/s-2-05.pdf (offers a proposal to limit the availability of 
minority and lack-of-marketability discounts through aggregation rules and a look-through 
rule) [hereinafter OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE]; Laura E. Cunningham, FLP 
Fix Must Be A Part of Transfer Tax Reform, 112 TAX NOTES 937 (2006) (advocating the 
approaches adopted in OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE and suggesting that even 
more aggressive measures be taken to curtail transfer tax valuation abuses).  For many 
years, several commentators have been proponents of using a system of attribution for 
intrafamily gifts.  See, e.g., Mary Louise Fellows & William H. Painter, Valuing Close 
Corporations for Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes: A Statutory Solution to the Disappearing Wealth 
Syndrome, 30 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1978); Laura E. Cunningham, Remember the Alamo: The IRS 
Needs Ammunition in Its Fight Against the FLP, 86 TAX NOTES 1461 (2000), Repetti, supra 
note 86, at 415. 
104 If a family attribution principle were enacted, taxpayers will most certainly 
attack it on constitutional grounds. In Land v. United States, 303 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1962), 
cert denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962), the Fifth Circuit suggests that the estate tax must be based 
on the value of the transferred interest that is in transit.  To the extent that the tax is not so 
limited, the Fifth Circuit intimated that it might constitute a direct tax that violates Article 
I, section 9, of the Constitution because it is not apportioned among the states on the basis 
of population. See id. at 172.  In Bright’s Estate v. United States, 658 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1981), 
the Fifth Circuit squarely rejected the IRS’s family attribution argument after reviewing this 
aspect of its earlier analysis in Land. Thus, Bright could conceivably be cited by taxpayers 
for the proposition that Congress may not constitutionally impose a family attribution 
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example, for purposes of valuing a taxpayer’s interest in a business, a 
taxpayer would generally be deemed to own the interests held by his/her 
spouse, children, grandchildren, and parents.  Depending upon several 
factors (e.g., remoteness of interest and proportion of ownership), business 
interests held by partnerships, trusts, estates, and corporations would 
likewise be deemed constructively owned by the taxpayer.  Application of 
the foregoing attribution rules would determine the taxpayer’s actual and 
constructive ownership. 
Next, the willing buyer / willing seller test would value, in the 
aggregate, the interests actually and constructively held by the taxpayer.   
Finally, the value determined under the second step would be 
multiplied by a fraction, the numerator of which would equal the 
percentage interest of the business enterprise being gifted and the 
denominator of which would equal the taxpayer’s actual and constructive 
ownership percentages in the business enterprise.   
If Congress were to adopt the proposed set of ownership 
attribution rules and institute the three-step valuation set forth above, 
minority discounts would largely be contained.  Application of these 
attribution rules would also curb marketability discounts. Unlike 
minority discounts, marketability discounts are available even where the 
transferred interest is a controlling interest.105 However, as the size of 
 
principle. See, e.g., S. Stacey Eastland, The Art of Making Uncle Sam Your Assignee Instead of 
Your Senior Partner:  The Use of Partnerships in Estate Planning, SK069 ALI-ABA 999, 1014 
(2005) (“The [estate] tax cannot be a ‘wealth tax’ or ‘property tax’ on the intrinsic value of 
an asset to the decedent or donor at the time the transfer occurs; rather, it must be a tax 
only on the value transferred.”). 
The constitutional aspect of Land, as well as Bright, is, however, of questionable 
validity.  In Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340 (1945), the Supreme Court had held that it 
was constitutional to impose the estate tax on the entire value of the husband’s and wife’s 
shares of community property when one died even though, under state law, the surviving 
spouse’s share was not transferred at the time of the decedent spouse’s death (i.e., in 
Fernandez, the Court did not require application of the in-transit concept). Surprisingly, 
however, neither Land nor Bright cites Fernandez. Nor do they explain how the in-transit 
valuation approach that they suggest is constitutionally required can be reconciled with the 
notion in Fernandez that value can be determined for transfer tax purposes based on a 
broader examination of the transaction.  See Estate of Jameson v. Comm’r of Internal 
Revenue, 267 F.3d 366, 374–75 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Fernandez but questioning the 
soundness of its reasoning); Shepherd v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 376, aff’d, 283 F.3d 1258 (11th 
Cir. 2002) (citing Fernandez); Young v. Comm’r, 110 T.C. 297 (1998) (not citing Fernandez,, 
and accepting the fact that Congress has the power to levy a tax upon the occasion of a 
joint tenant acquiring the status of survivor at the death of the other joint tenant). 
105 See, e.g., Curry v. United States, 706 F.2d 1424 (7th Cir. 1983) (refusing to 
require that the jury be instructed to use liquidation value as a floor in determining the 
value of a 53 percent stock interest).   
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the block increases, courts have almost universally held that size of the 
marketability discount correspondingly decreases.106 Thus, application 
of the proposed ownership attribution rules does double duty, retraining 
minority discounts as well as marketability discounts.107 
Consider how this proposed reform would operate.  In the previous 
example, in addition to the taxpayer’s 60 percent membership interest she 
actually owns, she would be deemed to constructively own her husband’s 
40 percent membership interest.  The next step calls for application of the 
willing buyer / willing seller test, which would value at $1 million the 
taxpayer’s 100 percent membership interest (i.e., 60 percent owned directly 
plus 40 percent owned by family attribution) in Highly Profitable, L.L.C.  
As a final step, since the taxpayer is giving away a 10 percent membership 
interest, the appropriate gift tax figure would therefore be $100,000 ($1 
million x 10 percent divided by 100 percent), keeping in mind that due to 
the taxpayer’s controlling interest, little or no marketability discount would 
be available.108 Under the proposed methodology, the gift tax result would 
be the same even if the taxpayer initially held a 40 percent membership 
interest and her spouse held a 60 percent interest.109 
In most instances utilization of the proposed family attribution 
methodology will result in the appropriate gift tax valuation result.  This is 
proven by the fact that after the taxpayer gifts the membership interest to 
her daughter, three scenarios are likely to ensue:  (1) the taxpayer will 
continue to gift membership interests to her daughter; (2) the taxpayer and 
her spouse will both decide to sell all of their membership interests to an 
 
106 See, e.g., Jones v. Comm’r, 116 T.C. 121, 135 (2001) (“The owner of the 
83.08-percent interest has the ability to persuade or coerce other partners into cooperating 
with the proposed sale.”).   
107 Other commentators have suggested limiting the availability of marketability 
discounts in instances in which a third or more of the assets of the business venture (by 
value) consist of marketable assets (such as cash, stock, commercial paper, or the like).  
From a policy perspective, these commentators argue that the application of a 
marketability discount is inappropriate when the assets internally owned by a business 
venture are largely liquid.  See OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE, supra note 103, at 
401–02.  See also, Cloutier v. Comm’r, 71 T.C.M. 2001 (1996) (indicating in footnote 5 of 
the opinion that marketability discount should not be substantial in the context of valuing 
a 100 percent interest). 
108 See supra note 35.   For purposes of this illustration, we could also assume that 
one-third of Highly Profitable’s assets are marketable, and, that being the case, a 
marketability discount would be precluded.  See supra note 107. 
109 The taxpayer would again be deemed to own 100 percent of Highly Profitable, 
L.L.C., worth $1 million.  This value would be multiplied by a fraction, the numerator of 
which would be the percentage gifted (i.e., 10 percent) and the denominator of which 
would be the interest she actually and constructively owned (i.e., 100 percent). 
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unrelated third party, in which case their daughter will likely join them in 
the sale; or (3) the taxpayer and her spouse will continue to hold their 
combined 90 percent membership interests until their respective deaths and 
then bequeath the balance of their membership interests to their daughter.  
Ex post, in each of these three scenarios, application of the suggested 
valuation approach makes sense because of the probability that the 
daughter will ultimately realize $100,000 from holding her 10 percent 
membership interest in Highly Profitable, L.L.C. (assuming, over time, that 
the overall value of the limited liability company remains constant).  
In a few cases, the suggested valuation approach will reach what 
some commentators will label an inappropriate outcome.  Consider what 
would happen in the prior example in the unlikely event that the taxpayer 
and her spouse were to sell their remaining 90 percent membership interest 
to an unrelated third party without their daughter’s consent or participation.  
No doubt, engaging in this sale will significantly diminish the value of the 
daughter’s membership interest in Highly Profitable, L.L.C., well below the 
reported $100,000 gift tax figure; after all, the daughter will no longer have 
a meaningful voice in addressing business governance issues, and she will 
not have a ready market in which to sell her interest.   
In this particular scenario, was it therefore misguided to have had 
the taxpayer who made this transfer to her daughter report a $100,000 gift?  
For several reasons, as to both the taxpayer and her daughter, the answer to 
this question is no.  First of all, in the vast majority of cases, donors will do 
everything in their power to engage in subsequent sales or exchanges that 
will enhance, rather than jeopardize, the asset values of previous gifts to 
their loved ones.  However, even if such is not the outcome, the taxpayer 
should still report a $100,000 gift. After all, the taxpayer’s sale to an 
unrelated party described in the previous paragraph was a discretionary act 
on the part of the taxpayer (along with her spouse’s concurrence); 
rhetorically, one must thus ask if these taxpayers have a legitimate right to 
complain if, in the aftermath of their choice, their daughter’s limited liability 
company interest diminished in value.  The daughter, too, must recognize 
that in commerce, valuation declines are a regular phenomenon and that 
whether the gifted membership interest is worth $100,000 or some lesser 
figure, she nevertheless received a windfall.   
In sum, valuation discounts are significantly eroding the gift tax 
base.110 Instituting legislation that would help eliminate this erosion would 
go a long way to putting the gift tax back on solid footing.111 
110 Such discounts significantly erode the estate tax base as well.  See, e.g., Church 
v. United States, 84 A.F.T.R. 804 (W.D. Texas 2000), aff’d without published opinion, 268 F.3d 
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2. Treatment of Trust Contributions with a Retained 
Interest as Incomplete Gifts 
 GRATs and QPRTs are trusts that taxpayers establish with a 
singular purpose in mind, namely, to make transfer tax–free wealth 
transfers.112 Given the naked tax-oriented objective of these trust 
instruments, Congress should eliminate their use.  
If taxpayers employ GRATs and QPRTs strictly as a means to 
defeat their transfer tax obligations and such trusts do not fulfill traditional 
trust goals (such as protecting the financial security of trust beneficiaries), 
Congress should revisit Code section 2702 and curb the use of these 
trusts.113 There is an easy way to accomplish this goal:  treat any trust 
contribution in which the taxpayer holds a retained interest as an 
incomplete gift.114 Only at the point in time that the taxpayer’s retained 
 
1063 (5th Cir. 2001) (taxpayer transferred her ranch and publicly traded securities in return 
for a limited partnership interest in a newly formed limited partnership and died two days 
later; court upheld a 58 percent discount based upon the noncontrolling and illiquid nature 
of her business interest).  To attain parity between the gift and estate taxes, the proposed 
valuation methodology should also be employed in valuing the decedent’s assets for 
computation of the estate taxes owed.  See OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE, supra 
note 103, at 396–404.   
111 Aside from instituting the proposed set of attribution rules, Congress should 
also amend the Code to overrule cases involving entities that are established strictly with a 
tax avoidance motive in mind (see supra note 48), making the gift of an interest in such an 
entity ineligible for discounts unless the entity was formed for a substantial nontax 
purpose. 
112 Many forms of trusts are established for nontax purposes.  See supra note 50.   
113 Consider that federal transfer taxes only apply to the nation’s wealthiest 
taxpayers.  See Center on Budget Policy Priorities, CBPP Examines Estate Tax Showdown,
2006 TNT 107-94 (June 5, 2006) (less than .5 percent of the overall taxpayer population is 
subject to the estate tax).  Therefore, aside from potential transfer tax savings, there is thus 
no apparent reason why taxpayers in this wealth category would need (or want) to establish 
trusts with retained annuity or income rights therein.   
114 Under the approach suggested in the text, the transfer is not deemed complete 
until the grantor’s interest in the trust terminates. Such a late-completion rule is not, 
however, the only available solution. The problematic aspect of GRATs and QPRTs could 
also be remedied under an early-completion rule, under which all amounts contributed to a 
trust are immediately subject to gift tax. Thus, a grantor who created a GRAT or QPRT 
would be subject to gift tax on the entire value of the property conveyed to the trust, 
rather than the more limited value of the remainder interest as current law permits. For a 
discussion of these alternative approaches, see Mitchell M. Gans, GRIT’s, GRAT’s and 
GRUT’s: Planning and Policy, 11 VA. TAX REV. 761, 815-16 (1992).  Interestingly, grantors 
could even be given an option to elect between these two rules; under current law, outside 
the context of QPRTs and GRATs, taxpayers are in effect permitted such an option, and 
no abuse or undervaluation results. That is, taxpayers can choose an outright gift, pay gift 
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interest is extinguished would the gift be considered complete and, for gift 
tax reporting purposes, an accurate value of the property actually being 
transferred be determined.     
To illustrate, suppose a taxpayer establishes a two-year GRAT with 
a 55 percent annuity payout and contributes income-producing rental 
property worth $1 million therein.  The Code would treat this trust 
contribution as an incomplete gift, and thus no gift tax return would need 
to be filed.  At the end of the two-year trust term, suppose the assets 
remaining in the GRAT after the annuity payouts were worth $500,000.  
This amount would constitute a gift and, for gift tax return filing purposes, 
would have to be reported.   
Like contributions to a GRAT, contributions to any form of trust in 
which the taxpayer held a retained interest (such as a QPRT) would be 
considered incomplete and, for gift tax reporting, be held in abeyance until 
the taxpayer relinquished the retained interest he or she held in the 
contributed trust property.  
Aside from treating trust contributions as incomplete, there are 
other options as well.  Consider that the difficulty with GRATs is that 
taxpayers often structure them so that there is no gift tax risk if the annuity 
amount is set at an amount that results in a taxable gift of $0 at the time the 
GRAT is funded.115 Yet, if the assets in the GRAT produce a return in 
excess of the section 7520 rate, it effects a transfer of wealth on a tax-free 
basis.  Conversely, if the GRAT fails to produce such a healthy annual 
return, the GRAT returns all of its assets to the taxpayer who, although not 
able to effectuate a wealth transfer, is no worse off for engaging in this 
stratagem.  
Suppose instead that at the time of the initial GRAT funding, a 
taxpayer, depending upon the amount of the trust contribution, had to pay 
a gift tax or exhaust all or a portion of his lifetime gift tax exemption 
amount.  This rule would create an important deterrent:  if the GRAT were 
to fail (i.e., its assets produced a rate of return equal to or below the section 
7520 rate), the taxpayer would have paid gift tax or forfeited all or a portion 
 
tax on the entire value of the gifted asset, and then exclude any post-gift appreciation from 
the estate.  In the alternative, taxpayers can structure a gift in trust so that no taxable gift 
occurs at inception, but the entire value of the trust’s assets at the time of death is included 
in the estate.  See I.R.C. §§ 2036(a)(2), 2038 (both Code sections include date-of-death 
value of trust assets in the estate where the grantor has retained sufficient control to negate 
the gift tax at inception).  As suggested, the same option could be extended to taxpayers 
who create GRATs and QPRTs without creating the potential for abuse. 
115 See supra note 57.   
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of his lifetime gift tax exemption even though all the trust assets were 
returned to him.   
Congress thus should mandate, at a minimum, a particular 
percentage of any GRAT contribution be treated as a taxable gift.  
Taxpayers who made GRAT contributions, no matter how large their 
retained interest, would be deemed to have made taxable gifts equal to 
some percentage, say 10 percent, of the fair market value of the contributed 
assets.116 By instituting this requirement, an element of risk would be 
infused into GRAT contributions (i.e., the value of the assets that remain in 
the GRAT after its term lapses may be less than 10 percent of the fair 
market value of the contributed assets), which could deeply damper their 
attractiveness.117 If Congress fails to sponsor this initiative, the IRS may 
have sufficient leeway in light of the statute’s legislative history to 
promulgate regulations that achieve this same outcome.118 
116 See I.R.C. § 2701(a)(4) (positing a minimum-value rule in the context of 
valuing closely held businesses); Dennis L. Belcher & Mary Louise Fellows, Task Force on 
Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes, Report on Reform of Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes, 58 TAX 
LAW. 93 (2004) [hereinafter Task Report] (advocating this approach, relying, in part, upon 
I.R.C. § 2701, which deals with a similar valuation issue requiring that the junior equity in a 
corporation or other entity be worth at least 10 percent of the value of the entity). 
117 Most recently, with respect to charitable remainder annuity trusts, Congress 
instituted a similar requirement; now, a trust does not qualify as a charitable remainder 
annuity trust unless the value of the charitable remainder with respect to any transfer to the 
trust is at least 10 percent of the initial net fair market value of all property transferred to 
the trust.  I.R.C. § 664(d)(1)(D).  There is no reason why Congress’s success in the 
charitable area cannot be replicated in the sphere of gratuitous transfers made into trusts 
with respect to noncharitable beneficiaries. 
118 In Tech. Adv. Mem. (TAM) 2002-45-053, supra note 57, the IRS, indicated 
that, under current law, a GRAT cannot be zeroed out, stating that “these gift 
arrangements as contrary to the principles of section 2702.” In other words, even if the 
GRAT is structured to comply with Walton v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 589 (2000), the annuity 
is not a qualified interest if the remainder has a value of zero. As a result, the entire value 
of the assets conveyed to the GRAT would be subject to gift tax. Unfortunately, neither 
the regulations nor the preamble contains a minimum-value rule with any specificity. 
Indeed, many practitioners apparently ignore this aspect of the TAM, although cautious 
practitioners are drafting their GRATs to minimize the risk that the TAM suggests. 
The IRS might nevertheless adopt a general rule to the effect that a GRAT 
cannot be zeroed out, reflecting the notion that the section itself did not anticipate that 
GRATs could be zeroed out. It might then create a safe-harbor exception, under which the 
IRS would not question the validity of the GRAT (i.e., the retained annuity would be 
treated as a qualified interest if the remainder had a value of, say, 10 percent of the value of 
the assets conveyed to the GRAT).  While such a regulation, issued more than fifteen years 
after the enactment of section 2702, might have been suspect at one time, regulations are 
no longer vulnerable simply because they were not issued contemporaneously with the 
enactment of the statute. See Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota) N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740-
41 (1996). 
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B. Instituting a Functional Gift Tax Reporting and 
Penalty System 
A key part of any successful tax system is taxpayer compliance.  
Taxpayer compliance is not something that just happens, however; to the 
contrary, through various mechanisms, Congress must induce taxpayer 
compliance.  When it comes to transactions between family members, 
courts have repeatedly acknowledged that “heightened scrutiny” is 
required.119 The reason for such heightened scrutiny is that related 
taxpayers may unite to defeat their tax obligations.  Congress, like the 
courts, has crafted many Code sections to preclude related taxpayers from 
conspiring to save taxes.120 However, even more action is needed.  Given 
the fact that the vast majority of gifts are made between family members, 
there is every reason to assume that the courts and Congress should 
exercise maximum vigilance.  Two ways to exercise such vigilance are for 
Congress (1) to institute a meaningful reporting regime and (2) a penalty 
structure that has some backbone.   
 
1. Reporting System 
A recent example of where Congress took measures to improve 
taxpayer compliance through a reporting system is in the area of tax 
shelters.  Congress instituted disclosure requirements that require material 
advisors121 to issue a return with respect to any reportable transaction 
(including a so-called “listed transaction”).122 Likewise, taxpayers who are 
participants in these “reportable events” are required to file disclosure 
 
119 See, e.g., Comm'r v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 746 (1949) (“[The] existence of 
the family relationship does not create a status which itself determines tax questions, but is 
simply a warning that things may not be what they seem.”); Kimbell v. United States, 371 
F.3d 257, 265 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[W]hen the transaction is between family members, it is 
subject to heightened scrutiny.”). 
120 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 267 (disallowing losses on asset sales between related 
parties).   
121 This is a person who provides any material aid, assistance, or advice with 
respect to organizing, managing, promoting, selling, implementing, insuring, or carrying 
out any reportable transaction (see infra note 122) and who directly or indirectly derives 
gross income in excess of a threshold amount (or such other amount prescribed by IRS) 
for that assistance or advice.  I.R.C. §  6111(b)(1)(A).   
122 A “reportable transaction” is generally a transaction of a type that the IRS 
determines as having a potential for tax avoidance or evasion.  I.R.C. §  6707A(c)(1).  The 
term listed transaction means a reportable transaction which is the same as, or substantially 
similar to, a transaction specifically identified by the Secretary as a tax avoidance 
transaction.  I.R.C. §  6707A(c)(2). 
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statements attached to their tax returns.123 By instituting these 
requirements, Congress boldly spoke:  illegitimate tax shelters are not to be 
tolerated.124 In contrast, when it comes to fostering compliance in the 
realm of gift tax compliance, Congress has barely uttered a peep.125 
If Congress wants to switch course and have taxpayers take their 
gift tax return obligations seriously, it should consider the fact that third-
party information returns have a proven track record of success in instilling 
taxpayer compliance with respect to the income tax;126 that being the case, 
Congress should extend their use to the sphere of the gift tax.  In the 
paragraphs that follow, we outline the reporting system we have in mind. 
Whenever a nonspousal donee receives a taxable gift (i.e., a gift that 
exceeds the gift tax annual exclusion or that does not qualify for medical or 
tuition exclusions),127 the donee would have to file an information return; 
furthermore, if the donee receives multiple gifts from the same donor the 
aggregate value of which during any calendar year exceeds the gift tax 
annual exclusion, the donee would likewise have to file an information 
return.  The proposed information return would delineate the names of the 
donor and donee, a description of the property gifted (including its tax 
basis), the date of the gift, and the fair market value of the gifted property.  
The scope of this reporting obligation would include contributions to 
irrevocable trusts in which the donor made completed gifts; that is, trustees 
of such trusts would be obligated to report trust contributions that are 
subject to gift tax.128 Bolstered by receipt of these information returns, the 
 
123 Taxpayers are instructed to use a Form 8886 (Reportable Transaction 
Disclosure Statement) to disclose tax shelter reportable transactions.  Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-
4(d). 
124 Tax shelter participants who are noncompliant face harsh penalties.  
Noncompliant marketers of such shelters, for example, must bear a $50,000 penalty for 
each failure to disclose.  I.R.C. § 6707(b)(1)   However, if the failure relates to a “listed 
transaction,” the penalty is the greater of (1) $200,000 or (2) 50 percent of the gross 
income received by the material advisor that is attributable to aid, assistance, or advice 
provided for the listed transaction before the date that the advisor files an information 
return that includes the transaction.  I.R.C. § 6707(b)(2).   A penalty structure of a similar 
nature applies to taxpayer participants who fail to make adequate disclosures.  I.R.C. § 
6707(A). 
125 See Dustin Stamper, IRS, Estate, Gift Tax Compliance Efforts Refocusing on 
Nonfilers, 2006 TAX NOTES TODAY 118-2 (June 26, 2006) (“[N]ew IRS estimates reveal that 
estate and gift tax nonfilers are responsible for a significant portion of the tax gap.”). 
126 See supra notes 65–69 and accompanying text.  
127 See supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text.  
128 This reporting obligation could also be extended to other entities, such as 
partnerships and corporations in which donors have the opportunity to make indirect gifts. 
To limit the administrative burden associated with this augmented attribution rule, it would 
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IRS would be far better situated to check the accuracy of donors’ gift tax 
returns (i.e., Form 709).  
Is third-party information return reporting such as the kind 
suggested in the prior paragraph administratively feasible?  There is 
evidence that this process can work; indeed, such a requirement is already 
in place with respect to the receipt of gifts and bequests from foreign 
individuals as well as distributions made from foreign trusts.  Under current 
law, if a foreign donor makes a sizable gift or bequest (i.e., in excess of 
$100,000) to a U.S. taxpayer or resident alien,129 the latter must report the 
receipt of such gift or bequest on a Form 3520;130 a similar rule applies in 
cases in which a foreign trust makes a distribution to a U.S. taxpayer or 
resident alien.131  Following this path already established with respect to 
foreign gifts and bequests, there is no reason why a similar reporting 
obligation could not be put into place for recipients of gifts made by U.S. 
taxpayers.132 
Broadening this third-party reporting requirement to include all 
gifts—foreign or domestic—would probably be the most effective way to 
give the gift tax “traction” in the area of taxpayer compliance.  Some 
commentators, however, would likely lament the institution of this third-
party reporting requirement.  Why?  They would argue that this reporting 
requirement puts recipients in the uncomfortable position of having to 
“tattle” on donors.  Put differently, does Congress really want to have 
taxpayers’ children (the recipient of most taxable gifts) serve as an 
enforcement arm of the IRS? 
However, it should not be psychologically troubling to have the 
recipients of sizable gifts report the taxable gifts they receive.  Notably, a 
 
only apply in those instances in which the taxpayer directly or constructively (via 
attribution rules) owned more than 50 percent of the entity in question.   
129 Notice 97-34, § VI.B.1, 1997-1 CB 422.  For tax years beginning in 2006, the 
reporting threshold amount is $12,760 in the case of gifts from foreign corporations and 
foreign partnerships.  Rev. Proc. 2005-70, § 3.32, 2005-47 I.R.B. 979. 
130 I.R.C. §  6039F(a).   
131 I.R.C. §  6048(a). 
132 If the recipient of a foreign gift fails to report it, Congress imposes a penalty 
of 5 percent of the amount of the gift for each month that the failure continues, up to a 
maximum penalty of 25 percent.  I.R.C. § 6039F(c)(1)(B).  A somewhat similar penalty 
applies in those cases in which a U.S. taxpayer or resident alien fails to report the receipt of 
a foreign trust distribution.  See I.R.C. § 6677(a)(1) (the penalty is equal to “35 percent of 
the gross reportable amount”; in addition, if any failure to file continues for more than 
ninety days after the day on which the IRS mails a notice of failure to file to the person 
responsible for the penalty, that person must pay an additional penalty of $10,000 for each 
thirty-day period (or fraction thereof) during which the failure continues, not to exceed the 
gross reportable amount.).   
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similar sort of complaint was lodged against an IRS research officer who, in 
the early 1980s, suggested taxpayers claiming their children as dependents 
provide the children’s social security numbers.133 At the time, there was an 
anguishing outcry that this requirement was too Big Brother in nature.  
Congress nevertheless heeded the IRS research officer’s recommendation, 
and seven million dependents suddenly vanished from the tax rolls, 
generating an additional $3 billion of revenue annually.134 The filing 
requirement we envision is no more intrusive than the disclosure of a 
dependent’s social security number or the litany of detailed information 
returns taxpayers are already required to issue.135 
If, however, the issuance of third-party information returns is 
considered too intrusive in nature and thus not politically tenable, there is at 
least one viable alternative.  As a stand-alone alternative (or as a 
complement to the information return reporting proposal we outlined 
above), Congress should require taxpayers on their income tax returns 
(Form 1040s) to answer affirmatively the following yes-or-no question:   
During the course of the prior calendar year, did you make or 
receive gifts from another taxpayer that exceeded $X (i.e., the 
annual gift tax exclusion) and that did not qualify for the 
medical and educational payment exclusions?136 
In responding to this yes-or-no question, a taxpayer who made or 
received a gift and did not want to report it would be required to 
affirmatively lie.  Given the greater psychological discomfort that people 
typically experience when lying (which constitutes an act of commission) as 
compared to not filing a return (which constitutes an act of omission),137 a 
 
133 Stephen J. Dubner & Steven D. Levitt, Filling in the Tax Gap:  Why Americans 
Should be Clamoring for the IRS to Do More Audits, Not Fewer, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 2, 2006) 
(discusses how IRS research officer John Szilagyi led the crusade to get this oversight 
mechanism into place). 
134 Id.
135 See supra notes 65–69 and accompanying text.  
136 See Task Report, supra note 116, at 122–24 (pointing out the need to ask 
donors a question on the Form 1040, but overlooking the need to ask the same question to 
donees).  
137 See generally, Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 499 (1943) (expressing the 
opinion that passive neglect of a statutory requirement is usually less offensive than active 
violation of a statutory duty); Brian J. Sullivan & Jessica L. Thorn, Tax Violations, 43 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 991 (2006) (describing the different states of mind necessary to trigger a 
criminal violation).  
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question of this sort may induce taxpayers to fulfill their gift tax return 
filing obligations.138  
2. Penalty System 
Another type of reform measure necessary to induce taxpayer 
compliance would be a meaningful penalty system.  Such penalties would 
apply in instances when taxpayers fail to timely file their gift tax returns or 
significantly underreport the amount of their gifts.  The structure of the 
penalty system could mirror the one already in place with one important 
difference:  for purposes of computing penalty amounts, it would ignore 
the availability of a taxpayer’s $1 million lifetime gift tax exemption.   
The specifics of the proposed penalties are as follows.  For every 
month taxpayers are delinquent in filing their gift tax returns, they would 
face a failure-to-timely-file penalty of 5 percent per month (up to a 25 
percent maximum); in instances when taxpayers underreported the amount 
of their gifts, they would bear an accuracy-related penalty of 20 percent.139 
Neither of these penalties would be calibrated based upon the amount of 
the gift tax actually due (which is often zero because of the donor’s $1 
million lifetime gift tax exemption);140 instead, penalties would be computed 
based upon the amount of gift tax that would be hypothetically due assuming 
the taxpayer had already exhausted his or her $1 million lifetime gift tax 
exemption.  Were Congress to institute a penalty structure formulated in 
this fashion, taxpayers would have to be wary of their derelictions, knowing 
that they might prove costly.  Interest on these proposed penalties would 
begin to accrue at the due date for the return.141 
To illustrate how these proposed penalties would operate, suppose 
a taxpayer gifted $500,000 worth of stock in a closely held business to his 
son.  Suppose further that the taxpayer failed to timely file a gift tax return 
and that three months after the due date of the gift tax return, the taxpayer 
fulfilled his filing obligation but negligently reported the value of the gift to 
be $300,000.   
 
138 See Paul Ekman, TELLING LIES, CLUES TO DECEIT IN THE MARKETPLACE,
POLITICS, AND MARRIAGE 29 (Norton 1991) ("liars may feel less guilt about concealing 
than falsifying”).  The same distinction is often made in the fraud context.  See, e.g., 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (Wills and Donative Transfers), § 8.3, comment j 
(indicating that, as a general rule, a finding of fraud requires an active misrepresentation 
rather than passive concealment). 
139 See I.R.C. § 6651 I.R.C. (delineating the failure-to-timely-file penalty) and 
I.R.C. § 6662 (delineating the accuracy-related penalty). 
140 I.R.C. §  2505.  
141 I.R.C. §  6601(c)(2)(B).  
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In this example, both the failure-to-timely-file and the accuracy 
penalties would apply.  This is true even though the taxpayer was not liable 
for actually paying a gift tax because his yet unused lifetime gift tax 
exemption was sufficient to shelter this transfer from gift tax.  As 
proposed, the failure-to-timely-file penalty would equal $33,750 (i.e., 
$225,000 (the amount of gift tax levied upon a $500,000 gift using the 
current gift tax rate of 45 percent) x .15 (.5 percent per month for each 
delinquent month x 3)).  In addition, there would also be an accuracy-
related penalty imposed equal to $18,000 (i.e., $200,000 (the underreported 
amount of the gift ($500,000 - $300,000)) x 45 percent (the 2007 gift tax 
rate) x .20).   Interest on both of these penalties would commence on the 
due date of the gift tax return.   
Furthermore, if Congress were to institute the proposed yes-or-no 
question on the face of the Form 1040 regarding the delivery or receipt of a 
gift (see part IV.B.1 above), a penalty of a different sort could be instituted.  
In cases in which the donees failed to answer this question or did so 
incorrectly, Congress could deny the gift’s tax-exempt stature under Code 
section 102, thereby making it taxable income to the donee under Code 
section 61.142 In cases in which the donors failed to answer this question or 
did so incorrectly, Congress could impose a penalty equal to the fair market 
value of the gift times the applicable gift tax rate (which is currently a flat 45 
percent).    
These proposed penalties would likely be taken far more seriously 
by taxpayers than the mirage-like system currently in place.  Once 
instituted, taxpayers would have to think twice before they scoffed at their 
gift tax return filing obligations.  And that is exactly the way a meaningful 
penalty structure should function. 
____________________________________ 
The modest reforms proposed in this paper will not cure all the ills 
affecting the overall health of the gift tax.  However, they are the most 
easily instituted, offer the greatest return, and should be politically palatable.  
Other reforms deserve serious consideration, too (in particular, the need to 
eliminate the manipulation of grantor trust status to effectuate transfer tax 
savings);143 Congress, however, should consider implementing these other 
 
142 Were this suggestion instituted, Congress would also have to consider 
extending the statute of limitations to adjust the donee’s income tax return to capture the 
income that would now be taxable.  See I.R.C. §  6501. 
143 Among the several ways taxpayers commonly circumvent their transfer tax 
obligations is to engage in the practice of selling their appreciating assets to so-called 
grantor trusts (i.e., for income tax purposes, the Code ignores the existence of these trusts 
and generally treats the grantor as the owner of the trust assets (see generally BRYLE M. 
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ABBIN, INCOME TAXATION OF FIDUCIARIES AND BENEFICIARIES, ch. 14 (2006)).  Here’s 
how this tax stratagem works:  A taxpayer makes a gift into a grantor trust equal to at least 
10 percent of the value of an asset that is to be purchased by the trust (this is done to show 
the IRS that the trust has sufficient assets to make an adequate down payment).  The 
trustee of the grantor trust then agrees to purchase a targeted asset from the taxpayer, 
using as consideration the property it recently acquired (via the initial gift) plus an 
installment note.  Because of the grantor status of the trust, the asset sale does not 
constitute a recognition event to the taxpayer.  Rev.  Rul. 85-13, 1985-1 C.B. 184.  
Furthermore, on a going-forward basis, the taxpayer continues to be taxed on the income 
the grantor trust generates (I.R.C. § 671); this ongoing income tax payment responsibility 
has the effect of allowing the trust assets to grow tax-free (a benefit that inures to the trust 
beneficiaries) and depleting the taxpayer’s estate (a benefit that reduces the taxpayer’s 
ultimate estate tax burden). See, e.g., Thomas C. Baird, A Potpourri of Leverage Transfers Using 
Defective Grantor Trusts, SG020 ALI-ABA 661 (2001) (describing the myriad of ways 
taxpayers can manipulate grantor trust status to defeat their transfer tax obligations).    
There are several ways Congress could eliminate the problem of taxpayers 
manipulating grantor trust status to defeat their gift and estate tax obligations.  One 
possibility is that Congress could provide that, in the case of an installment sale to a related 
party (see supra note 104 and accompanying text), any note received by a party related to 
the seller is to be treated as a retained interest in the assets sold.  Thus, only when the note 
is completely discharged would the seller be deemed to have made a completed gift equal 
to the excess of the value of the assets at that time over the amounts previously received 
on the note.  Consider the case of a taxpayer who sold a $1 million piece of real estate to 
her daughter in return for a ten-year $100,000 installment note.  By year ten, assume the 
value of the real estate had appreciated to $2.5 million; were that the case, in year ten, after 
the note had been satisfied, the taxpayer would be deemed to have made a $1.5 million gift 
to her daughter (i.e., the excess of $2.5 less the $1 million she received in payments).   
Another possibility would be to reform the grantor trust rules so that they would 
not be subject to such easy taxpayer manipulation.  Jay A. Soled, Reforming the Grantor Trust 
Rules, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 375 (2001)    
A final possibility would be to make the income tax rules related to grantor trust 
status consistent with the gift and estate tax rules.  Robert T. Danforth, A Proposal for 
Integrating the Income and Transfer Taxation of Trusts, 18 VA. TAX L. REV. 543 (1999). 
The IRS, too, might take curative action in the form of issuing administrative 
regulations that apply Code sections 2702 and 2036 to these installment sale arrangements:  
More specifically, for purposes of section 2702, the installment note would be viewed as a 
retained interest, causing it to be disregarded for gift tax purposes; and under Code section 
2036, the assets sold to the trust would be included in the seller’s estate if the note were 
still outstanding at the time of the seller’s death. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-35-026 (ruling that 
Code section 2702 did not apply to an installment sale but stating that it would apply if it 
were ultimately determined that the note, in substance, was equity; and refusing to rule on 
whether, at the seller’s death, the assets sold to the trust would be subject to section 2036).   
Dicta found in Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Smith, 356 U.S. 274 (1958), however, 
limits the IRS’s ability to advance these arguments.  This dicta makes the following two 
points:  First, in the case of a sale for a private annuity, the seller is not deemed to retain an 
interest in the assets sold.  Second, if three conditions are met, namely, the obligation to 
make the annuity payments is a personal obligation of the transferee, the obligation is not 
chargeable to the property conveyed, and the amount of the annuity is not a function of 
the income produced by the property conveyed, Code section 2036 does not apply. See id.
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art45
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reforms simultaneously with or after imposition of the more modest and 
necessary reforms proposed in this paper.   
 
V. CONCLUSION 
Because the gift tax raises virtually no revenue, it is a tax that 
Congress might rather choose to ignore.  Indeed, taxpayers are apt to do 
the same, but for a different reason:  when it comes to gift giving, rather 
than being saddled with a tax or a reporting obligation, many taxpayers 
believe that they should be commended for their altruism.144 
However, given the historical roots of the gift tax, namely, to 
safeguard the integrities of the income and estate taxes (which are 
significant revenue generators),145 Congress ignores the gift tax to the 
possible peril of the nation’s financial solvency.  After all, if the gift tax is at 
risk of being easily circumvented, then, by axiom, so too are the other two 
taxes it guards.  Certainly, taxpayers who are in the financial position of 
making significant wealth transfers must recognize that there is a price (in 
the form of a transfer tax) associated with their privilege of gift giving.  
Sometimes problems lack solutions; fortunately, this is not one of 
those situations.  To the contrary, opportunities are readily at hand to 
restore integrity to the gift tax and, by doing so, the other taxes it protects.  
There are two keys to restoring integrity to the gift tax.  The first is to 
broaden the base of the gift tax by putting proper valuation mechanisms in 
place and eliminating abusive forms of trust instruments.  The second is to 
institute reporting mechanisms to facilitate IRS oversight and a penalty 
system that taxpayers will think twice about before violating. 
The reforms proposed herein do not constitute a tax increase.  
Rather, they will help ensure that the gift tax will function in a manner 
consistent with its historic underpinnings.  Politicians of all political 
persuasions should therefore welcome these reforms.  
 
at 281 n.8. The IRS has reluctantly conceded that in analyzing installment sales and private 
annuity transactions, this dictum is controlling, essentially negating the possible application 
of Code section 2036 to installment sales made to grantor trusts. Rev. Rul. 77-193, 1977-1 
C.B. 273.  For a more detailed discussion of this argument, see Gans & Blattmachr, supra 
note 50. 
144 For a detailed analysis of the complex motives that underlie donative transfers, 
see Eric A. Posner, Altruism, Status, and Trust in the Law of Gifts and Gratuitous Promises, 1997 
WIS. L. REV. 567.   
145 See supra notes 8–23. 
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